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INTRODUCTION
“[T]he war between disparate impact and equal protection will be
waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about
how—and on what terms—to make peace between them.”1 This Article
addresses Justice Scalia’s premonition in Ricci v. DeStefano2 by
providing an analysis of how that war may be waged and whether peace
can be made between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and the
Equal Protection Clause.
Ricci involved a challenge to the City of New Haven’s decision to
void the test results of an examination required for promotion within the
City’s fire department. Firefighters were required to pass the
examination to qualify for promotion to the rank of lieutenant or
captain. In 2003, 118 firefighters took the examination.3
The test adversely affected African-American firefighters, who
passed the examination at a lower rate than Caucasian firefighters.
Twenty-five out of forty-three Caucasians, six out of nineteen AfricanAmericans, and three out of fifteen Hispanics who took the lieutenant
examination passed.4 Sixteen out of twenty-five Caucasians, three out
of eight African-Americans, and three out of eight Hispanics who took
the captain examination passed.5
Because of the disproportionate number of African-American
firefighters who failed the test, the City feared that it would be subject
to discrimination lawsuits6 under the disparate impact provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 Disparate impact focuses on the
results of employment decisions and imposes liability when
employment practices cause a disparate impact on the basis of race or
any other protected class.8 Under the “four-fifths” or “80%” rule
promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
through the Uniform Guidelines, adverse impact can be shown when the
pass rate for any racial group is less than four-fifths of the pass rate of

1. 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2664 (majority opinion).
4. Id. at 2666.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2664.
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(2), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008)).
8. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (stating that Congress intended to
focus on the consequences of employment decisions).
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the most successful group.9 An employer may be liable for disparate
impact even when the employer lacks any intent to discriminate,10
whereas disparate treatment liability rests on proving employer intent.11
“The City was faced with a prima facie case of disparate-impact
liability”12 because the pass rates for the Hispanic and AfricanAmerican test takers fell below the 80% rule.13 Consequently, the City
refused to certify the tests and thereby voided the results.14
As it turned out, the City found itself stuck between Title VII’s
disparate impact and disparate treatment provisions. Although it
avoided discrimination lawsuits from African-American firefighters for
the disparate impact of the examination, in the end, the City was sued
by seventeen Caucasian firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter15 who
passed the examination and believed they would have likely been
promoted if the test results were used.16 The plaintiff firefighters
contended that the City violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the disparate treatment provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17 The Title VII and Equal
Protection claims rested on the assertion that by voiding the test results,
the City intentionally discriminated against the plaintiffs based on
race.18
9. The “four-fifths rule” or “80% rule” functions in the following way:
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or
eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded
by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact, while a greater
than four-fifths rate will generally not be regarded by Federal enforcement agencies as
evidence of adverse impact. Smaller differences in selection rate may nevertheless
constitute adverse impact, where they are significant in both statistical and practical
terms or where a user’s actions have discouraged applicants disproportionately on
grounds of race, sex, or ethnic group.
U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures,
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (2008).
10. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (stating that even good intentions are immaterial when
mechanisms are unrelated to job capacity and adversely affect minorities).
11. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805–07 (1973) (stating that the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer’s reason for refusing to hire was “discriminatory in
its application”).
12. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677–78 (2009).
13. On the lieutenant examination, the pass rate for each racial group was the following:
58.1% for Caucasians, 31.6% for African-Americans, and 20% for Hispanics. On the captain
examination, the pass rate for Caucasians was 64% and for Hispanics and African-Americans was
37.5%. Id. at 2678.
14. Id. at 2664.
15. Id. at 2671.
16. Id. at 2664.
17. Id. at 2671.
18. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that the City violated the disparate treatment
provision by invalidating the tests because of their adverse impact on
African-Americans.19 In order to be justified in voiding the test results,
the City was required to show a “strong basis in evidence” for a
potential disparate impact violation.20 The Court found no such basis.21
Although the Court reconciled the tension between Title VII’s disparate
impact and disparate treatment provisions, the Court sidestepped the
constitutional question of whether Title VII’s disparate impact provision
may cause an employer to violate an employee’s constitutional right to
Equal Protection.22 The Court’s failure to resolve the tension between
Title VII’s disparate impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause
prompted Justice Scalia’s prediction of an impending war between the
two. Justice Scalia feared that “[the Court’s] resolution of this dispute
merely postpone[d] the evil day on which the Court will have to
confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparateimpact provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?”23
The war that Justice Scalia foreshadowed might not be too distant. In
the term following Ricci, the Court decided Lewis v. City of Chicago,
which involved a disparate impact claim by African-Americans
challenging the city’s hiring procedures for its fire department.24 The
plaintiffs alleged that the city’s use of test scores to hire firefighters had
a disproportionate adverse effect on African-Americans.25 Although the
Court did not decide whether the plaintiffs adequately proved their
claim, the Court held that they stated a cognizable claim.26 The Court
relied on Ricci to conclude that “a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer ‘uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact’ on one of the

19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 2681.
Id.
Id.
The Court stated:
Our statutory holding does not address the constitutionality of the measures taken here
in purported compliance with Title VII. We also do not hold that meeting the strongbasis-in-evidence standard would satisfy the Equal Protection Clause in a future case.
As we explain below, because respondents have not met their burden under Title VII,
we need not decide whether a legitimate fear of disparate impact is ever sufficient to
justify discriminatory treatment under the Constitution.
Id. at 2676.
23. Id. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2010).
25. Id. at 2196.
26. Id. at 2198.
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prohibited bases.”27 This case is likely to lead to an increase in
disparate impact claims,28 and soon the disparate impact provision may
have to reckon with the Equal Protection Clause.
This Article examines the constitutional question left open by the
Court in Ricci, by exploring the possible outcomes when the war that
Justice Scalia predicted is waged. Professor Richard Primus first noted
the conflict between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and Equal
Protection29 in his seminal article cited by Justice Scalia in Ricci.30
Recent works have responded to Ricci’s statutory implications, but none
has given extensive treatment to the constitutional issue since Professor
Primus.31 This Article seeks to answer the constitutional question—
whether Title VII’s disparate impact provision violates the Equal
Protection Clause by requiring employers to consider race in their
employment practices. Under Equal Protection jurisprudence, racial
classifications trigger strict scrutiny and are permitted only if necessary
to serve a compelling purpose.32 This Article seeks to test Title VII’s
disparate impact provision under strict scrutiny to determine if it can
survive an Equal Protection challenge. This Article’s focus is to
provide an extensive search for a compelling purpose that may justify
the racial classifications that are required under Title VII’s disparate
impact provision.33 Specifically, this Article evaluates six compelling
purposes that may be asserted to defend Title VII’s disparate impact
provision under an Equal Protection Clause challenge and anticipates
the attacks that may be lodged against those defenses. In so doing, the
27. Id. at 2197 (emphasis omitted).
28. The city warned that “[e]mployers may face new disparate-impact suits for practices they
have used regularly for years.” Id. at 2200.
29. Professor Primus was the first to explore the tension between Title VII’s disparate impact
provision and the Equal Protection Clause, but there had been other discussions concerning the
Equal Protection Clause and facially neutral acts with discriminatory effects. See Richard A.
Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494
(2003). Professor Primus described the first round of legal questions as centering on whether
facially neutral state action that had a discriminatory effect but lacked a discriminatory intent
violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 494–95. The issue that arose in the second round
involved whether Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Commerce Clause could
validate facially neutral laws that prohibited practices with racially disparate impact. Id. at 495.
30. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. One commentator has briefly taken up the issue in reviewing the Ricci opinion. See
generally Kenneth L. Marcus, The War between Disparate Impact and Equal Protection, 2009
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 53, 55 (2008–2009) (arguing that equal protection is consistent with
disparate impact only when impact is narrowly construed).
32. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
33. A discussion of whether disparate impact satisfies strict scrutiny’s second prong—whether
disparate impact’s use of racial classifications is narrowly tailored—is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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inquiry should not be interpreted as hostility toward affirmative action;
the Article makes no normative arguments on the subject. Rather, the
focus of this work is on a discussion of how Title VII disparate impact
fits within the analytic framework of the Equal Protection Clause, as it
specifically relates to race. A discussion about other forms of disparate
impact is also beyond the scope of this Article.34
Part I of this Article traces the development of disparate impact
theory and its codification, the development of strict scrutiny, and the
Supreme Court’s treatment of cases involving Equal Protection Clause
challenges against governmental use of racial classifications.
Additionally, Part I discusses the ways that disparate impact implicates
racial classifications by centering liability on racial proportions and
forcing employers to consider race in making employment decisions.
Consequently, Part I concludes that disparate impact is likely to be
subject to strict scrutiny. Part II briefly explores whether there is a
theoretical conflict between Title VII’s disparate impact provision and
the Equal Protection Clause and concludes they are symmetrical in their
focus on protecting individuals, as opposed to groups.
Part III explores whether there is a doctrinal conflict between Title
VII’s disparate impact provision and Equal Protection. Operating on
the assumption that the disparate impact provision implicates racial
classifications, this Part examines six rationales that may be asserted as
compelling interests to defend the provision against an Equal Protection
challenge: (1) remedying past discrimination; (2) smoking out
discrimination (intentional or unconscious); (3) obtaining the benefits of
diversity; (4) providing role models; (5) satisfying an operational need;
and (6) providing equal employment opportunity by removing barriers.
This Part analyzes whether case law and empirical evidence support
each rationale. Part III also explores how each rationale can be applied
in the employment context to serve as a compelling interest for Title
VII’s disparate impact provision and provides a critique of each
justification. Finally, this Article concludes that five of the six
rationales are inadequate to serve as a compelling interest that can
justify the disparate impact provision’s use of a “highly suspect tool”
like racial classifications.35 The disparate impact provision, however, is

34. Disparate impact can also occur when an employment practice causes a disparate impact
on the basis of color, religion, sex, or national origin. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat.
241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008)).
35. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (explaining that the
purpose of strict scrutiny is to assure that the legislative goal is important enough to warrant racial
classifications).
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most likely to survive strict scrutiny by serving the compelling purpose
of removing barriers to provide equal employment opportunities.
I. SURVEYING THE BATTLEFIELD TERRAIN: BACKGROUND CASES AND
DOCTRINES
This Part briefly traces the development of the disparate impact
theory and its codification. Also, this Part discusses the level of
scrutiny applied to racial classifications under the Equal Protection
Clause and concludes that strict scrutiny should be applied to disparate
impact because disparate impact relies on racial classifications.
A. Disparate Impact
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964
Congress enacted section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 to provide protections against employment discrimination and
other illegalities by providing as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.36

The difference between the two provisions of § 703(a) is intent.
Under § 703(a)(1), commonly known as the disparate treatment
provision, courts require a showing of conscious intent to discriminate
or a discriminatory motive for employer liability.37 In contrast, §
703(a)(2), the disparate impact provision, as interpreted by Griggs, does
not require intent.38 Disparate impact is result-oriented, focusing on
consequences instead of motive.39 The Court recently clarified in Lewis
36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2008) (emphases added).
37. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (“In such ‘disparate
treatment’ cases, which involve ‘the most easily understood type of discrimination,’ . . . the
plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.” (citing
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977))).
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
39. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 136 (2003) (“Defining
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that “[u]nless and until the defendant [employer] pleads and proves a
business-necessity defense, the plaintiff wins simply by showing the
stated elements” of disparate impact.40 Under the disparate impact
provision, employers may be liable when they use neutral criteria that
cause a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected group and cannot
justify the criteria based on business necessity and job relatedness.41
Even with a showing of necessity and job relatedness, employers whose
practices have a disproportionate adverse effect may be liable if they
refuse to use equally effective alternatives that have a less adverse
effect.42
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
The landmark case Griggs v. Duke Power Co.43 was only the
Supreme Court’s second interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,44 which led to the Court’s adoption of the disparate impact
theory.45 The issue in Griggs was whether Title VII permitted an
employer to condition employment or job transfers on a high school
diploma or passing a standardized general intelligence test.46 Before
Title VII became effective, Duke Power Company had discriminated on

discrimination in terms of consequences rather than purpose or motive, disparate impact theory
interprets Title VII to require that members of protected groups not be unnecessarily harmed in
employment because of group differences.”).
40. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2198 (2010).
41. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
42. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009). “The constitutional standard for
adjudicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is [not] identical to the standards applicable
under Title VII.” Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). In Washington v. Davis, the
Court held that disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to prove invidious racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 242. In contrast, the disparate impact
provision in Title VII only requires proof of a disproportionate effect—not intent. See Griggs,
401 U.S. at 432.
43. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). For excellent summaries of the development of disparate impact,
see Lorin J. Lapidus, Diversity’s Divergence: A Post-Grutter Examination of Racial Preferences
In Public Employment, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 199, 211–27 (2006); Michael Selmi, Was the
Disparate Impact Theory A Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 701–34 (2006); Elaine W. Shoben,
Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What’s Griggs Still Good For? What
Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 600–07 (2004); Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1513–24 (2004);
Ronald Turner, Grutter, The Diversity Justification, And Workplace Affirmative Action, 43
BRANDEIS L.J. 199, 222–36 (2004–2005).
44. Selmi, supra note 43, at 708.
45. The disparate impact theory was ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court in Griggs, but
it did not originate with the Court. See id. (“[T]wo important cases, two influential law review
articles, and a strategic decision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) all
contributed to the creation of the [disparate impact] theory . . . .”).
46. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425–26.
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the basis of race in its hiring and transfer policies.47 African-Americans
were employed only in the one department that offered the lowest
paying jobs.48 After Title VII’s passage, the company changed its
policies to include the high school diploma and aptitude test
requirements.49
The new requirements imposed by the company adversely affected
African-Americans.50 The district court, however, found no intentional
discrimination by the employer because the high school diploma and
aptitude tests were applied equally to Caucasians and AfricanAmericans.51
The Supreme Court unanimously invalidated the policies, holding
that the Civil Rights Act prohibited “not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”52
The Court explained that employers acting with good intent or absent
discriminatory intent cannot “redeem” employment practices that cause
a disparate impact53 and must justify their policies with a business
necessity related to job performance.54 Because there was evidence that
workers who did not have a high school education or who did not take
the intelligence test performed their jobs satisfactorily, the Court
concluded that the company failed to show a business necessity for the
requirements.55 As a result of Griggs, the Court’s interpretation of Title
VII expanded the protection afforded by the statute to include both
disparate treatment and disparate impact.

47. Id. at 426–27.
48. Id. at 427.
49. Id. at 427–28.
50. Id. at 429. The Court noted that in 1960, 34% of white males had completed high school
as compared with 12% of African-American males in the state, and that the EEOC found 58% of
whites passed the generalized intelligence tests as compared with 6% of African-Americans. Id.
at 431 n.6.
51. Id. at 429. The Court recognized the employer’s efforts to assist employees by financing
two-thirds of the cost for high school training. Id. at 432. These efforts likely militated against a
finding of intent by the lower court. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 719 (“The company’s
explanation for the test, and its willingness to pay some of the education costs for those who
sought to finish high school, transformed the case, at least in the Supreme Court’s eyes, from one
of intentional discrimination to something different.”).
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
53. Id. at 432.
54. Id. at 431.
55. Id. at 431–32.
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3. Post-Griggs Cases: From Albemarle to Wards Cove
Four years after Griggs, the Court clarified in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody56 the requirement of job relatedness announced earlier in
Griggs. In this case, the company imposed similar requirements as in
Griggs.57 The company argued that the high school education and
intelligence test requirements were necessary for safety and efficiency58
because of the increasing sophistication of the plant’s operations.59 The
company, however, failed to validate the tests.60 The Court reaffirmed,
“[D]iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by
professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or
are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated.”61 The Court also expanded the disparate impact theory by
allowing plaintiffs to rebut an employer’s business necessity and job
relatedness justification by showing that reasonable, less discriminatory
alternatives existed.62
In 1982, the Supreme Court additionally fortified the disparate impact
theory in Connecticut v. Teal63 by rejecting an employer’s bottom-line
defense. In its defense, the employer contended that although the test at
issue caused a disparate impact upon minorities, the result of the entire
hiring process rendered no disparate impact because minorities were
proportionately hired and promoted.64 The Court emphasized, “It is
clear beyond cavil that the obligation imposed by Title VII is to provide
an equal opportunity for each applicant regardless of race, without
regard to whether members of the applicant’s race are already
proportionally represented in the work force.”65
Several years later, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, the Court
extended disparate impact liability to include the use of subjective or
discretionary employment practices.66 The following year, however,

56. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
57. Id. at 410–11.
58. Id. at 411.
59. Id. at 428.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 431 (quoting U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
62. Id. at 425.
63. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
64. Id. at 452.
65. Id. at 454–55.
66. 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
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the Court began to curtail its expansion of disparate impact. In Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,67 the Court relaxed the standard for
showing business necessity68 and shifted the burden of persuasion to the
plaintiff.69
4. Codification of Disparate Impact
Congress regarded the Court’s decision in Wards Cove, as well as the
others that followed,70 as a diminution71 of employment rights protected
in Title VII72 and accordingly responded by passing the Civil Rights

67. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
68. Id. at 659. The Court modified the business necessity requirement to a showing of
“whether a challenged practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer” and rejected a requirement that the employer show that the practice is “essential”
or “indispensable.” Id.
69. The employer has the burden of producing evidence of a business necessity, but plaintiff
bears the burden of persuasion to “prove that it was ‘because of such individual’s race, color,’
etc., that [the plaintiff] was denied employment opportunity.” Id. at 659–60 (quoting 42 U.S.C §
2000e-2(a)).
70. Congress also sought to redress the damage brought on by Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; and
Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. For a historical review of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, see David A. Cathcart & Mark Snyderman, The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 8 LAB. LAW. 849,
849–55 (1992); Roger Clegg, Introduction: A Brief History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 54 LA.
L. REV. 1459, 1463 (1994); Douglas W. Kmiec, The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional,
Statutory, and Philosophical Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911, 913 (1993); Claude Platton,
Note, Title VII Disparate Impact Suits Against State Governments After Hibbs and Lane, 55
DUKE L.J. 641, 665–69 (2005).
71. But see Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A “Quota Bill,” a Codification
of Griggs, a Partial Return to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287,
293 (1993) (“The most important aspect of Griggs . . . was not challenged by a single Justice in
Wards Cove. At most, the Wards Cove opinion made only marginal adjustments to the disparateimpact doctrine, although . . . it arguably did not change the doctrine at all.”).
72. Congress stated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 the following purposes for the Act:
(1) to provide appropriate remedies for intentional discrimination and unlawful
harassment in the workplace;
(2) to codify the concepts of “business necessity” and “job related” enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other
Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642
(1989);
(3) to confirm statutory authority and provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication
of disparate impact suits under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e et seq.); and
(4) to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of
relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection for victims of
discrimination.
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Act in 1991.73 In § 703(k) of Title VII, Congress codified disparate
impact, which previously had been merely an interpretation of §
703(a)(2) applied by the courts. The amended statute provides:
(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this subchapter only if—
(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity; or
(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice
and the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment
practice.74

B. Racial Classification Under Equal Protection and Strict Scrutiny
Whether disparate impact can prevail under an Equal Protection
challenge depends on the level of scrutiny applied, which in turn
depends on whether disparate impact involves racial classifications.
This section discusses the circumstances under which strict scrutiny is
applied and considers whether disparate impact implicates racial
classifications and is, therefore, subject to strict scrutiny.
1. Racial Classification
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
against governmental racial classification.75 City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson76 and Adarand v. Peña77 established that all racial
classifications, even with a benign purpose, are subject to strict
scrutiny78—“that is, such classifications are constitutional only if they

Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071.
73. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694 (stating
the intent of Congress was to “respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the civil
rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions . . . [and] to strengthen
existing protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to provide more
effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination”).
74. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A) (2008)).
75. The Supreme Court has “consistently repudiated ‘[distinctions] between citizens solely
because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose intuitions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality.’” Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (alteration in
original) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943))).
76. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
77. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
78. Initially, there were several factors for determining if a racial classification is
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are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental
interests . . . .”79 Classifications based on race, alienage, or national
origin are subject to strict scrutiny because “these factors are so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or
deserving as others.”80 Strict scrutiny functions to “‘smoke out’
illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing
a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.”81
It is unclear if the disparate impact provision is an express racial
classification,82 but the Court’s analysis in Ricci may shed light on how
the Court might answer this question. Because the city decided not to
certify the examination scores as a result of “the statistical disparity
based on race,”83 the Court characterized the city’s action as “express,
race-based decisionmaking.”84 The Court explained, “[T]he City
rejected the test results because ‘too many whites and not enough
minorities would be promoted were the lists to be certified.’”85 The
City’s interest in avoiding disparate impact liability led it to make

constitutional: whether it is benign as opposed to invidious and whether it is state or federal
action, which bears on whether a Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment violation is being
asserted. Croson held that “the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not
dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification” and adopted
strict scrutiny as the unified standard for benign and invidious racial classifications. 488 U.S. at
493 (emphasis added). The Court explained the necessity of subjecting benign classifications to
strict scrutiny: “[T]here is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or
‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial
inferiority or simple racial politics.” Id. Adarand reaffirmed Croson’s adoption of strict scrutiny
“despite the surface appeal of holding ‘benign’ racial classifications to a lower standard.” 515
U.S. at 226. The Court’s decision in Adarand clarified that it makes no difference whether the
actor is the federal, state, or local government or whether a Fifth Amendment Due Process or the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause claim is being asserted: “[A]ll racial
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny . . . .” Id. at 227.
For a discussion of the development of strict scrutiny, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial
Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1273–85 (2007); K.G. Jan Pillai, Phantom of the Strict
Scrutiny, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 397, 397–419 (1997); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict
in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793,
798–801 (2006).
79. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227.
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
82. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2696–704 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that no racial classification exists).
83. Id. at 2674 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 2673.
85. Id. (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, 152 (D. Conn. 2006)).
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decisions based on race. Similarly, for other employers, it would be
difficult to divorce considerations of race from their employment
decisions that are centered on avoiding disparate impact liability.
Additionally, if the City’s race-conscious action taken to avoid
disparate impact liability can be characterized as racial classification,
then a fortiori Title VII’s imposition of disparate impact liability on the
basis of race can be similarly characterized. It would be impossible to
assess compliance with the disparate impact provision without grouping
employees or candidates into racial categories. Thus, although Title VII
does not explicitly classify people into different racial categories, the
application of the disparate impact provision, as seen in Ricci, may be
the functional equivalent.
There may be disagreement as to whether Title VII’s disparate impact
provision should be subject to strict scrutiny,86 but the purpose of this
Article is to test the provision under the most rigorous conditions—that
being strict scrutiny—to determine if it can withstand an Equal
Protection Clause challenge.87 Therefore, this Article will proceed on
the presumption that the disparate impact provision is a racial
classification that triggers strict scrutiny.
2. Strict Scrutiny
Once strict scrutiny is invoked, the application of strict scrutiny
requires the government to show that its action is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling purpose.88 The point of the compelling purpose

86. A normative discussion of whether neutral practices that are race conscious should be
subject to strict scrutiny is a subject for an article in itself.
87. I recognize that the ability of Title VII’s disparate impact provision to withstand an Equal
Protection Clause challenge might depend on the level of scrutiny applied.
88. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (explaining that racial
classifications imposed by a governmental actor “are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests”). The application of strict
scrutiny has been described as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.” Professor Gerald Gunther first
coined this now oft-quoted phrase. Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Forward:
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
Whether a case survives strict scrutiny depends on the context. In an empirical study of cases
in 1990–2003 subjected to strict scrutiny, Professor Adam Winkler found that 27% of the suspect
classification cases survived. Winkler, supra note 78, at 814–15. In comparison, the study
reported the survival rate of other cases reviewed under strict scrutiny:
religious liberty
59%
freedom of association 33%
fundamental rights
24%
freedom of speech
22%
Id. at 815; see Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
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requirement is to evaluate the importance of the government’s objective
and ensure that the particular goal is worthy of pursuit when compared
to the harm that may ensue.89
The narrow tailoring component serves to verify that the purported
purpose is indeed the actual purpose. It aids in “smoking out” any
illegitimate purpose90 and assures, by evaluating other alternatives, that
the challenged action is necessary to accomplish the government’s
goal.91
II. PHILOSOPHICAL OR THEORETICAL CONFLICT?
Before this Article turns to the main inquiry of whether there is a
doctrinal conflict between the disparate impact provision and Equal
Protection Clause, another relevant query worth exploring is whether
there is a theoretical or philosophical conflict between the two. In terms
of whom the two doctrines are intended to protect, there is symmetry
between the disparate impact provision and the Equal Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause protects “persons, not groups,”92 as
expressed in the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment.93
The disparate impact provision similarly protects persons rather than
groups. This conclusion is supported by the Court’s reasoning in
Connecticut v. Teal because of its rejection of the bottom-line defense.94
In Teal, the test the employer used as a basis for promotion had a
disparate impact on African-Americans,95 which the employer did not
dispute.96 The employer, however, argued that there was no disparate
impact overall—on the bottom-line—because the test did not actually
“deprive disproportionate numbers of blacks of promotions.”97
350, 366–67 (2002) (critiquing the Rehnquist Court’s approach to equal protection).
89. See Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (2000) (explaining that the
“compelling governmental interest” requirement allows a reviewing court to evaluate the
importance of the government’s goal in using a classification, and also permits the court to weigh
the government’s goal with potential “harm wrought by use of the classification”).
90. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
91. Rubin, supra note 89, at 14.
92. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227 (recognizing “the basic principle that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect persons, not groups”).
93. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
94. 457 U.S. 440, 452 (1982).
95. Id. at 442–43. The passing rate for African-Americans was 68% of the passing rate for
Caucasians. Id. at 443. This resulted in disparate impact as defined by the four-fifths rule of the
Uniform Guidelines implemented by the EEOC. Id. at 444.
96. Id. at 444.
97. Id. at 452.
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Although a smaller percentage of African-Americans passed the test
than Caucasians, after the employer applied an affirmative action
program, a greater percentage of African-Americans than Caucasians
were promoted.98 The bottom-line defense used in Teal was premised
on the argument that, overall, no group suffered as a consequence of the
test.99 The Court, however, rejected this defense because Title VII
affords equal opportunity to “each applicant.”100 Relying on the
language in § 703(a)(2), the Court concluded that the disparate impact
theory “prohibits practices that would deprive or tend to deprive ‘any
individual of employment opportunities’”101 and “the principle focus . .
. is the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection
of the minority group as a whole.”102 Thus, at least theoretically, the
disparate impact provision and Equal Protection Clause are consistent in
their focus on protecting individuals.
III. BATTLEFIELD STRATEGIES FOR FINDING A COMPELLING INTEREST
The question left lingering in Ricci is whether Title VII’s disparate
impact provision violates the Equal Protection Clause by causing
employers to take race into account in deciding which employment
policies to adopt.103 Consequently, if disparate impact is to survive the
war, it must first shield itself with a compelling interest.
The purpose of this Part is to explore the possible compelling
interests that may justify the use of racial classifications that underlie
disparate impact. This Part will examine six grounds that may serve as
compelling justifications: (1) remedying past discrimination; (2)
smoking out intentional or unconscious discrimination; (3) obtaining the
benefits attributable to diversity; (4) providing role models; (5) meeting
operational needs; and (6) providing equal employment opportunities by
removing barriers. An exploration of each rationale includes an
analysis of whether case law or empirical evidence can support the
rationale as a compelling interest. Finally, this Part provides a critique
for each justification.

98. Id. at 444.
99. Id. at 452.
100. Id. at 454–55.
101. Id. at 453.
102. Id. at 453–54 (emphases added).
103. State action exists because Congress is requiring employers to act in a certain way. See
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–16 (1989) (holding that regulations that
authorized, but not required, employers to administer blood and urine tests constituted state action
because the government encouraged this practice).
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A. Remedying Past Discrimination Versus Societal Discrimination
Governmental bodies have used racial classifications to address
generalized societal discrimination and past discrimination by the
governmental actor. This section discusses the Supreme Court’s
treatment of remedying societal discrimination and past discrimination
as compelling interests under Equal Protection and examines whether
the disparate impact provision can be appropriately used as a remedial
measure to survive strict scrutiny. This section concludes that it is
difficult to justify disparate impact’s use of racial classification on a
remedial need because a showing of past discrimination by a state actor
is necessary.
1. Societal Discrimination
The Court has unequivocally disallowed remedying past societal
discrimination to be a sufficient compelling governmental interest104
because “societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy.”105 If the interest of the
disparate impact provision is to remedy past social wrongs, then it
would fail the compelling interest component of the strict scrutiny test.
The Court’s statement in Teal could lead one to believe that Griggs, at
least in part, involved an interest in remedying past societal
discrimination. In Teal, the Court stated, “Griggs was rightly concerned
that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority
citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control, not be allowed to
work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the
remainder of their lives.”106 The Court’s statement in Teal suggests that
Griggs was intended to be a remedy for the past societal discrimination
that resulted in inadequate education and limited employment
opportunities for African-Americans.
Griggs, however, rejected the interpretation of Title VII as a remedial
measure for past social harms. The Court clarified:
[Title VII] does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination . . . . What is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification.107

104.
105.
106.
107.

Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 269 (1986) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 276.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 447.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
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This clarification in Griggs rebuts the suspicion that the disparate
impact provision’s use of racial classification was intended to promote
the impermissible purpose of rectifying past societal discrimination.
2. Remedial Purpose Recognized as Compelling
While remedying societal discrimination is not sufficiently
compelling, the Court has recognized a remedial need to compensate for
the government’s own past discrimination as a compelling purpose.
The Court has set forth in Regents of University of California v.
Bakke108 that to justify using racial classification as a remedy for past
discrimination, a government actor must show that it engaged in
statutory or constitutional violations.109 A mere recitation of remedial
need is not enough.
a. Insufficient Evidence of Remedial Need
In Bakke and its progeny, the Court invalidated purported remedial
policies because the government failed to substantiate its race-based
program with evidence showing a remedial need. In Bakke, the
controversy centered on a medical school’s admission procedure that
reserved sixteen out of one hundred seats in its entering class for
minorities.110 The Court invalidated the admissions policy because the
“history of discrimination in society at large”111 could not justify the
medical school’s use of a racial quota in its admissions process when
there lacked “judicial, legislative, or administrative findings of
constitutional or statutory violations.”112 As the Court explained, “Only
then does the government have a compelling interest in favoring one
race over another.”113
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,114 the Court reaffirmed
Bakke’s “distinction between ‘societal discrimination,’ which is an
inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications, and the type of
identified discrimination that can support and define the scope of racebased relief.”115 The issue in Wygant involved a school board’s layoff
procedure that required the retention of the most senior teachers unless
the percentage of minority teachers laid off exceeded the percentage of
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 301–02, 309.
Id. at 279.
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496 (1989).
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307–09).
476 U.S. 267 (1986).
Croson, 488 U.S. at 497 (discussing Wygant, generally).
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minority teachers retained.116 The policy, which was instituted because
of racial tension in the community and schools,117 resulted in the
retention of minority teachers with less seniority than the nonminority
teachers who were laid off.118
The school board defended its policy as providing minority role
models for minority students in an effort to ameliorate the effects of
The Court rejected this justification,
societal discrimination.119
declaring that “[t]his Court has never held that societal discrimination
alone is sufficient to justify a racial classification. Rather, the Court has
insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the
governmental unit involved before allowing use of racial classifications
in order to remedy such discrimination.”120 The school board did not
have “a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action
was necessary”121 because the “statistical disparity between students
and teachers had no probative value in demonstrating the kind of prior
discrimination in hiring or promotion that would justify race-based
relief.”122
Similarly, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the government lacked a
strong basis in evidence for its remedial measures.123 In Croson, the
city council adopted a plan that required prime contractors that receive
city construction contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the contract
award to Minority Business Enterprises.124 The city council passed the
plan for a remedial “purpose of promoting wider participation by
minority business enterprises in the construction of public projects.”125
However, there was no evidence of discrimination by the city in
awarding contracts or by the prime contractors against minority-owned
subcontractors.126 The Court reiterated the requirement that there be
“some showing of a prior discrimination by a governmental unit
involved”127 and explained that “if the city could show that it had
116. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 269–70.
117. Id. at 270.
118. Id. at 272. The nonminority teachers affected by the policy sued the school board,
alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, among other claims. Id.
119. Id. at 274.
120. Id. at 269.
121. Id. at 277.
122. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (discussing the failure of
the role model theory that was presented in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, 294).
123. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500.
124. Id. at 477.
125. Id. at 478.
126. Id. at 480, 485.
127. Id. at 492. Subsequent cases adhered strictly to Croson’s and Wygant’s requirement that
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essentially become a ‘passive participant’ in a system of racial
exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry, . . .
the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system.”128
Finally, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1,129 there was no compelling interest because the remedial
need had ceased. In this case, the Court considered whether public
school districts that had not previously engaged in segregation may
assign students to schools based on racial classifications.130 The Seattle
School District allowed its students to submit a list of preferences in
selecting a high school to attend. In cases where too many students
chose a particular school, the school district used “tie breakers” to
decide which students would attend the school.131 Students who had
siblings attending the chosen school received first priority in
enrollment.132 The second-level tiebreaker involved consideration of
the “racial composition of the particular school and the race of the
individual student.”133 If the school’s racial composition was not within
ten percentage points of the district’s white to non-white racial
distribution, then the district assigned students on the basis of how they
would contribute to the school’s racial balance.134
The school district was unable to justify its racial classification on
remedial grounds because although the public schools in one particular
county had previously segregated students based on race, the schools
eventually “achieved unitary status” and were no longer subject to
desegregation decrees.135 The achievement of unitary status rebutted
any necessity of using racial classifications to remedy constitutional or
statutory violations.136

the government must show past discrimination to substantiate remedial racial classifications. See
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2675 (2009) (“The Court has held that certain government
actions to remedy past racial discrimination—actions that are themselves based on race—are
constitutional only where there is a ‘strong basis in evidence’ that the remedial actions were
necessary.” (citing Croson, 488 U.S. at 500)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200,
220 (1995) (“‘[I]t must have sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that there has been prior
discrimination.’” (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277)).
128. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
129. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
130. Id. at 711.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 711–12.
133. Id. at 712.
134. Id. The final tiebreaker was the distance between the student’s residence and the
preferred school. Id.
135. Id. at 720–21.
136. Id. at 721.
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b. Sufficient Evidence of Remedial Need
In two cases, however, the Court found a sufficient need to remedy
past discrimination. In Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers’
International Association v. EEOC,137 the Court upheld a raceconscious quota that provided remedial relief for prior union
discrimination against African-Americans. In this case, the union had
previously excluded African-Americans from union membership and
participation in its apprenticeship program.138 Consequently, it was
sued for its discriminatory activities. To resolve the suit, the district
court established a 29% non-white membership goal139 because of the
union’s “long and persistent pattern of discrimination” that had
“consistently and egregiously violated Title VII.”140 During a span of
seven years, the union delayed implementing the district court’s
order141 and was twice cited for contempt by the court.142 At the last
hearing, the district court modified the membership goal and ordered the
union to establish a fund “to be used for the purpose of remedying
discrimination.”143 The Supreme Court upheld the membership goal
and fund against an Equal Protection challenge144 because both
measures were necessary to remedy the union’s persistent
discrimination and Title VII violations.145

137. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
138. Id. at 427.
139. Id. at 432. This goal was later upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
140. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order. Id. at 433.
141. The district court found that the union had resisted implementing the court’s prior order
in the following ways:
(1) adopted a policy of underutilizing the apprenticeship program in order to limit
nonwhite membership and employment opportunities; (2) refused to conduct the
general publicity campaign required by the O & J and RAAPO to inform nonwhites of
membership opportunities; (3) added a job protection provision to the union’s
collective-bargaining agreement that favored older workers and discriminated against
nonwhites (old workers provision); (4) issued unauthorized work permits to white
workers from sister locals; and (5) failed to maintain and submit records and reports
required by RAAPO, the O & J, and the administrator, thus making it difficult to
monitor [the union’s] compliance with the court’s order.
Id. at 434–35.
142. The district court entered an order and judgment after the trial in 1975. Id. at 431. The
two contempt proceedings took place in 1982 and 1983. Id. at 434–35.
143. Id. at 436.
144. Id. at 440. The plaintiffs pursued a claim under the equal protection component of the
Due Process Clause, which for all intents and purposes, is analytically equivalent to the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For an explanation of the congruence between
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment, see also
supra text accompanying note 78.
145. Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 436.
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Also, in United States v. Paradise,146 the Court upheld a quota for the
promotion of African-Americans that was intended to remedy the
systematic exclusion of African-Americans as state troopers.147 In
1972, the district court found that the Alabama Department of Public
Safety had discriminated against African-Americans.148 As a result, the
district court issued an order that the department hire one AfricanAmerican trooper for each Caucasian trooper until the percentage of
African-American troopers within the state reached 25%.149 Eleven
years later, there was still not one African-American trooper in the
upper ranks.150 Consequently, the district court imposed a 50%
promotional quota in the upper ranks.151 In reviewing this quota, the
Supreme Court upheld the quota because the district court substantiated
a compelling purpose of remedying the department’s past
discrimination in the hiring and promotion of African-Americans
among the state trooper force.152 The relief crafted by the district court
was justified by “the department’s failure after almost twelve years to
eradicate the continuing effects of its own discrimination.”153
The above cases, whether the Court found a compelling need or not,
illustrate the Court’s insistence on a showing of past discrimination by
the government actor as a predicate to establishing a racial
classification, even a benign one.
3. Analysis of Disparate Impact Serving a Remedial Purpose
An argument could be made that the disparate impact provision’s use
of racial classification serves a compelling interest because it was
intended to remedy past discrimination. The disparate impact theory
was conceived to address seniority systems and lines154 used to
146. 480 U.S. 149 (1986).
147. Id. at 153.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 154–55.
150. Id. at 162–63. There were only four black corporals out of sixty-six, but no blacks
among the ranks of sergeants, captains, or majors. Id. at 163.
151. Id. at 163.
152. Id. at 170.
153. Id. at 169.
154. Congress expressed concern over the misuse of such employment practices:
Employment discrimination, as we know today, is a far more complex and pervasive
phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the problem in terms
of “systems” and “effects” rather than simply intentional wrongs. The literature on the
subject is replete with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of
progression, perpetuation of the present effects of earlier discriminatory practices
through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements.
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 694 (1991).
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perpetuate past intentional discrimination.155 The allusion to prior
discriminatory practices in several of the Court’s opinions could support
an inference that disparate impact was intended to provide remedial
relief for these pervasive and systemic discriminatory schemes.
In Griggs, the Court stated,
The objective . . . of Title VII is . . . to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.
Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
“freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.156

Similarly, the Court in Sheet Metal Workers opined,
Congress enacted Title VII based on its determination that racial
minorities were subject to pervasive and systematic discrimination in
employment. It was clear to Congress that the crux of the problem was
to open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which
have been traditionally closed to them, . . . and it was this problem that
Title VII’s prohibition against racial discrimination was primarily
addressed.157

Notwithstanding these passages showing a remedial intent behind
disparate impact, “the mere recitation of ‘benign’ or legitimate purpose
for a racial classification is entitled to little or no weight.”158 The
lessons of Bakke, Wygant, and Croson prove that there must be an
administrative, legislative, or judicial finding that employers have
violated the Constitution or a statute before disparate impact can be
implemented as a remedial measure. Additionally, Parents Involved is
instructive for the lesson that once discrimination has been rectified, a
remedial purpose cannot sustain a racial classification.
Defending disparate impact on a remedial need rationale is difficult
because disparate impact seems to suffer the same defects as the
155. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 705 (“[T]he disparate impact theory arose initially to deal
with specific practices, seniority systems and written tests, that were perpetuating past intentional
discrimination.”).
Section 703(h) of Title VII protects “bona fide” seniority systems if they “are not the result of
an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2006); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 192 (2004) (stating that the federal
involvement in fighting discrimination in employment began in response to resistance to
integration and the emergence of a national civil rights movement).
156. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971) (emphasis added).
157. 478 U.S. at 448 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)).
158. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).
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programs in Bakke, Wygant, and Croson. According to the Court’s
interpretation in Griggs and Sheet Metal Workers, an argument can be
made that Congress intended for disparate impact to remedy the
discriminatory practices that excluded African-Americans from
employment. Such an interest, however, would be as amorphous as the
interest in setting a quota in Croson to remedy the exclusion of AfricanAmericans from unions and training programs.159 As the Court stated
in Croson,
While there is no doubt that the sorry history of both private and
public discrimination in this country has contributed to the lack of
opportunities for black entrepreneurs, this observation, standing alone,
cannot justify a rigid racial quota . . . . Like the claim that
discrimination in primary and secondary schooling justifies a rigid
racial preference in medical school admissions, an amorphous claim
that there has been past discrimination in a particular industry cannot
justify the use of an unyielding quota.160

In Wygant, the Court concluded that the “statistical disparity between
students and teachers had no probative value in demonstrating the kind
of prior discrimination in hiring or promotion that would justify racebased relief.”161 Similarly, the Croson court found that the 30% setaside “[could] not in any realistic sense be tied to any injury suffered by
anyone.”162 Likewise, in the context of disparate impact, it could be
argued that the disparity manifested by the application of the four-fifths

159. The city contended that past exclusion of African-Americans “has prevented them from
following the traditional path from laborer to entrepreneur.” Id. at 498 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
160. Id. at 499. The Court was not persuaded by a “highly conclusionary statement of a
proponent of the Plan that there was racial discrimination in the construction industry ‘in this
area, the State, and around the nation’” and by “the city manager [who] had related his view that
racial discrimination still plagued the construction industry in his home city of Pittsburgh.” Id. at
500. These statements, the Court explained, were
of little probative value in establishing identified discrimination in the Richmond
construction industry. The factfinding process of legislative bodies is generally entitled
to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary. But when a
legislative body chooses to employ a suspect classification, it cannot rest upon a
generalized assertion as to the classification’s relevance to its goals.
Id.
161. Id. at 497 (discussing Wygant).
162. Id. at 499. At the time when the Court decided Croson, there were 234 Minority
Business Enterprise programs. Jeffrey M. Hanson, Note, Hanging By Yarns?: Deficiencies in
Anecdotal Evidence Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public
Contracting, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1433, 1444 (2003). To salvage some of these programs after
Croson, state and local governments spent fifty-five million dollars to commission more than 140
disparity studies to substantiate a compelling remedial interest in using racial set-aside programs.
Id.
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rule163 reflects merely a current state of racial imbalance resulting from
the employer’s selection process. A showing that racial disparity exists
in success rates among candidates or applicants lacks probative value in
showing that a particular employer had engaged in prior discrimination.
The disparate impact provision cannot be tied to a remedial need
because it applies to all employers and may subject a new employer to
liability, even when the employer lacks any business history.
In contrast, the remedial plans in Paradise and Sheet Metal Workers
were upheld because the Court found that the government actor itself
engaged in prior discrimination and court-ordered remedial programs
were directed at providing relief from that particular government actor’s
past discriminatory activities. An extension of Paradise and Sheet
Metal Workers to disparate impact would require a demonstration that a
particular employer had discriminated before disparate impact can be
applied as a remedial measure against that employer. This would limit
the application of disparate impact to a case-by-case basis, rather than
its current broad utilization.
The Court has waived the requirement for demonstrating prior
constitutional or statutory violations as a prerequisite for remedial racial
classifications, but that case is inapposite. In United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,164 a union and employer voluntarily entered into an
agreement requiring a quota for minority employees to be admitted into
a training program.165 The Court approved of this program, holding
that Title VII did not prohibit voluntary compliance.166 Weber is
inapposite because the Court reviewed the program at issue under Title
VII, not the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, Weber involved a
quota voluntarily instituted by private parties, not a government actor.
Some statements made by the Court in dicta, however, complicate the
discussion as to whether there is a remedial need for disparate impact.
In passing, the Bakke Court discussed the disparate impact standard
under Title VII:
[T]he presumption in Griggs—that disparate impact without any
showing of business justification established the existence of
discrimination in violation of the statute—was based on legislative
determinations, . . . that past discrimination had handicapped various

163.
164.
165.
166.

For an explanation of the “four-fifths” rule, see supra text accompanying note 9.
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 209.
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minority groups to such an extent that disparate impact could be
traced to identifiable instances of past discrimination.167

The Court’s belief that disparate impact can be linked to “identifiable
instances of past discrimination” may imply that the Court would find a
strong basis in evidence that there is a remedial need for disparate
impact. But under subsequent Court decisions, those identifiable
instances of discriminatory conduct must be traced to the actor seeking
to implement the remedial program. In the present case, because
disparate impact is being federally enforced, it is the federal government
that seeks to remedy past discrimination if a remedial argument is to be
made. If disparate impact can be defended as serving a remedial need,
the federal government must show that the particular employer had
previously discriminated. Without particularized evidence of prior
discriminatory misconduct by a specific employer, disparate impact
would be susceptible to the criticism that it is attempting to remedy past
societal discrimination.
B. “Smoking Out” Discrimination
Justice Scalia, in his concurrence in Ricci,168 suggested that another
possible defense of disparate impact against an Equal Protection claim
might be to frame it as a tool for smoking out discrimination. This
section considers different forms of discrimination—intentional and
unconscious discrimination—and how disparate impact might be used
to uncover them. Also, this section examines case law and empirical
evidence to determine whether smoking out discrimination can be a
compelling interest for disparate impact’s use of racial classifications to
survive strict scrutiny.
1. Pretextual or Intentional Discrimination
There are varying forms of discrimination. Overt discrimination is
the most obvious. Pretextual discrimination is a subtle form of
“intentional discrimination hidden behind a veneer of facially neutral
practices.”169

167. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.44 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(emphasis added).
168. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Primus,
supra note 29, at 498–99, 520–21).
169. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate
Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1541 (1996).
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a. The Need for Disparate Impact Because of Difficulty in Proving
Intent
Because pretextual discrimination is subtle, it makes detection of
intentional discrimination difficult. Consequently, one justification for
allowing racial classifications in disparate impact is to compensate for
the difficulty in identifying instances of intentional discrimination. One
can argue that Griggs is a prime example of pretextual discrimination
and why disparate impact is needed to address the subtle forms of
intentional discrimination, such as the use of neutral criteria. The
peculiar timing of events and the history of the employer’s actions raise
concern about the employer’s intent behind the neutral criteria
implemented in Griggs. Prior to Title VII, the employer in Griggs had
engaged in “overt racial discrimination”170 by restricting AfricanAmerican employees to work in the lowest paying department.171 But
after the Act became effective, the employer replaced its intentionally
discriminatory practice with the intelligence test and high school
education requirements.172 Griggs seems to represent intentional use of
neutral criteria to discriminate.173
The district court, however, found in Griggs that there was no
discriminatory intent behind the adoption of the hiring and promotion
requirements.174 The district court’s finding is problematic to the
argument that Griggs is a vindication of employees’ rights against
intentionally discriminatory use of neutral criteria. Griggs makes clear
that disparate impact is not predicated on intent, and courts have
subsequently interpreted Griggs “as an endorsement of ‘pure’ disparate
impact theory” independent of intent.175

170. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971).
171. Id. at 427.
172. Id. at 427–28. Professor Rutherglen argues that “in Griggs, the fact that the employer
substituted an intelligence test for outright segregation of its employees suggests that it was not
genuinely seeking to measure intelligence . . . .” George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact under
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1320–21 (1987).
173. See Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1331 (“In hindsight, Griggs appears to be a case of
obvious pretextual discrimination . . . .”).
174. The appellate court affirmed this finding:
The Court of Appeals noted, however, that the District Court was correct in its
conclusion that there was no showing of a racial purpose or invidious intent in the
adoption of the high school diploma requirement or generalized intelligence test and
that these standards had been applied fairly to whites and Negroes alike.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429.
175. Martha Chamallas, Evolving Conceptions of Equality Under Title VII: Disparate Impact
Theory and the Demise of the Bottom Line Principle, 31 UCLA L. REV. 305, 342 (1983).
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On the other hand, the district court’s inability to find intentional
discrimination in Griggs can bolster the argument that disparate impact
is needed because of the challenging task of proving an employer acted
with discriminatory intent. The fact that the seemingly pretextual
discrimination in Griggs can escape a finding of intentional conduct
underscores a possible justification for disparate impact.176
b. How Disparate Impact Can Smoke Out Intentional Discrimination
Assuming that detecting intentional discrimination is a compelling
purpose served by disparate impact, how might disparate impact smoke
out such discrimination if it is hard to prove? Disparate impact can
smoke out intentional discrimination through the requirements that an
employer show business necessity and job relatedness177 and use less
adverse alternatives. When a plaintiff proves a prima facie case through
a showing of disparity, the employer must demonstrate that the practice
is consistent with business necessity and is job related.178 Then, the
plaintiff may rebut business necessity with evidence of the availability
of alternatives that have less adverse impact.179 Business necessity and
job relatedness help to detect discrimination because if an employment
practice lacks a significant relationship to job performance, one could
doubt the legitimacy of the practice. The requirement that employers
use less disparate alternatives contributes to the ability to smoke out
intentional discrimination because availability of alternatives would
refute the necessity of the practice. As explained in Albemarle, the
employer’s refusal to adopt an equally effective alternative that has a

176. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 318 (2009) (citing Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of
Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 290–91 (1997)) (stating the difficulty of proving
intent).
177. The conjunctive requirements of both job relatedness and business necessity have
puzzled scholars and commentators. See, e.g., Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims under
the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1993). The requirement for both job
relatedness and business necessity seems to be duplicative. As some have pointed out, it is
difficult to imagine a selection criteria that is job related but not consistent with business
necessity, or vice versa. Id.
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008) (stating that upon the complaining party’s
demonstration of a disparate impact, an employer must show “that the challenged practice is job
related” and “consistent with business necessity”).
179. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that an employment practice is unlawful based
on disparate impact if the complaining party makes a demonstration of available alternative
employment practices and also demonstrates the employer’s refusal to adopt such an alternative
practice).
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less disparate impact would be evidence of “pretextual”
discrimination.180
In order for the requirements of disparate impact to aid in the
disparate impact provision’s ability to detect intentional discrimination,
courts need to be clear as to the contours of business necessity and job
relatedness. Concurrent with codifying disparate impact, Congress
provided an interpretative memorandum as a guide to enforcing the
business necessity and job relatedness requirements.181
The
memorandum instructed that business necessity and job relatedness
would retain their definitions in Griggs and the cases before Wards
Cove.182 The memorandum, however, provided little clarity because
there was no settled understanding of business necessity and job
relatedness in Griggs or subsequent cases.
In Griggs alone, the Court articulated several definitions for business
necessity: Employers must show that their practices are “related to job
performance,”183 “have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question,”184 “are a reasonable measure of job performance,”185 and
“measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.”186
Because the Supreme Court has not decided a disparate impact case
under Title VII since the codification of disparate impact in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,187 its indirection throughout the development of
disparate impact has resulted in varying interpretations by the lower
courts.
180. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (“Such a showing would be
evidence that the employer was using its tests merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination.”).
181. See 137 CONG. REC. 30630, 30662 (1991) (stating that the purpose of the legislation was
to codify the definitions of “business necessity” and “job related” according to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., which determined that an employment practice
that merely relates to a legitimate business purpose or serves the employer’s legitimate business
goals will not exculpate the employer under the disparate impact provision (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)).
182. Id. Congress was unable to agree on a statutory definition of “business necessity.” See
Hugh Davis Graham, The Act and the American Regulatory State, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 59 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2000). As a result, Congress accompanied the Act
with contradictory memoranda from various congressional leaders. Id. Among the memoranda
published in the Congressional Record was Senator John Danforth’s, which is cited as the
exclusive source for the legislative history and intent concerning the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases. Id. “This attempt within a statute to establish its own exclusive legislative history
may [have been] unprecedented in the United States Code.” Id. (citation omitted).
183. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
184. Id. at 432.
185. Id. at 436.
186. Id.
187. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU L. REV. 81, 100
(2009).
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The varying formulations of the disparate impact requirements
include the following:
(1) [R]equiring proof of either job-relatedness or necessity, or failing
to distinguish between the two; (2) . . . requiring absolute necessity;
and (3) . . . requiring reasonable necessity, including cases where the
reasonableness of an employment criteria is determined on a sliding
scale depending upon the nature of the employment and risks
involved.188

According to one commentator, the most rigorous standard requires that
an employer substantiates a business necessity through showing
“minimum qualifications that are necessary to perform the job in
question successfully.”189 Another commentator regards the strict
necessity standard to be the most arduous for employers.190 The most
lax standard requires only that an employment practice “serves, in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”191
The selection of a particular formulation over another will bear on the
ability of disparate impact to smoke out intentional discrimination.
Thus, without an agreement as to a unified formulation of the disparate
impact requirements, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of
disparate impact as a detection device for intentional discrimination.
c. Problems with the “Smoking Out” Discrimination Rationale
i. Disparate Impact Is Not More Difficult to Prove than Intentional
Discrimination
One justification for disparate impact is that it is needed to smoke out
intentional discrimination because such discrimination is difficult to
prove. But if this is not the case, then the compelling interest for the
racial classification in disparate impact is greatly diminished. Disparate
impact is presumed to be easier to prove than intentional

188. Rosemary Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45
RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1029–30 (1993).
189. Corbett, supra note 187, at 114–15 (citing Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d
478, 490 (3d Cir. 1999)).
190. Spiropoulos, supra note 169, at 1543.
191. Corbett, supra note 187, at 114 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
659 (1989)).
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discrimination192 because a prima facie case of disparate impact rests
merely on showing a disproportionately adverse effect.193
One study, however, has shown that disparate impact claims, contrary
to popular assumptions, are more difficult to prove than disparate
treatment claims.194 One explanation for the difficulty in proving
disparate impact claims is that the business necessity defense poses a
significant obstacle for plaintiffs195 due to the deference that courts give
to employers when evaluating business necessity.196 Additionally,
disparate impact claims appear to have little success outside of the
context of written tests.197 Finally, “many successful disparate impact
claims also succeeded under a disparate treatment approach,198 thus
rendering the disparate impact theory largely superfluous.”199 If
disparate impact is not easier to prove, then this undermines the
“smoking out theory”: intentional discrimination need not be smoked
out if it is easier to prove than disparate impact. Therefore, this could
eliminate “smoking out” intentional discrimination as one possible
compelling interest served by disparate impact.

192. Selmi, supra note 43, at 734 (“[O]ne of the central attractions to disparate impact claims
is the perception that they are easier to prove than claims of intentional discrimination . . . . In
reality, however, the opposite is true: Disparate impact claims are more difficult to prove than
standard intentional discrimination claims.”).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2008) (explaining that a complaining party can
demonstrate a disproportionately adverse effect by showing that use of a particular employment
practice causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and
that the challenged practice is unrelated for the position in question or consistent with business
necessity).
194. Selmi, supra note 43, at 734.
195. See id. at 749 (“The expectation that these [disparate impact] claims would be easier to
establish than intentional discrimination claims rests entirely on the first part of the theory
regarding the prima facie case of discrimination, but ignores the business necessity prong, which
has always proved the greater hurdle.”).
196. See Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward a Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84
IND. L.J. 773, 778 (2009) (“[B]usiness necessity [is] a standard which is rather deferential to
employers.”).
197. See Selmi, supra note 43, at 753–57 (arguing that written tests and their inherent
shortfalls remain prevalent because there has been very little development or progress in the
ability to predict academic or employment potential).
198. See Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1331 (suggesting that Griggs “could equally well
have been the subject of a claim of disparate treatment”).
199. Selmi, supra note 43, at 742.
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ii. Disparate Impact as an Alternative Method of Proving Disparate
Treatment
It is appealing to treat disparate impact as another method of proving
intentional discrimination or disparate treatment.200 The problem with
this theory, however, is that it “does not offer any real constraints . . . .
After all, the courts could scarcely invoke disparate impact any time
they suspected a trial court’s or jury’s findings of no intent to
discriminate were incorrect.”201 Another limitation to treating disparate
impact as an evidentiary tool to identify intentional discrimination is
Justice Scalia’s criticism that “the disparate-impact provisions sweep
too broadly to be fairly characterized in such a fashion—since they fail
to provide an affirmative defense for good-faith (i.e., nonracially
motivated) conduct, or perhaps even for good faith plus hiring standards
that are entirely reasonable.”202
Also, if Congress had intended for disparate impact to provide an
alternative method of establishing intentional discrimination, then the
remedies for disparate impact would mirror those of disparate treatment.
This, however, is not the case: the remedies for disparate impact are
more limited than for disparate treatment. For example, compensatory
and punitive damages are not available for disparate impact cases.
Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that a plaintiff may
recover compensatory and punitive damages for claims of “unlawful
intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful
because of its disparate impact).”203 Additionally, the burdens of
200. The modes of proof for disparate treatment include “(1) direct vs. indirect modes of
proof; (2) individual vs. pattern and practice cases or class actions; and (3) single motive vs.
mixed motives cases.” Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious
Motive In Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 448 (2000). McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973), and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981), provided an indirect method of proving intent for individual cases.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334–43 (1977), developed a method of proof for cases
involving a pattern or practice of discrimination. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins addressed the
issue of mixed motives. 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)), as recognized
in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
201. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1522.
202. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2682 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)); see also
Penn Lerblance, Introducing the Americans with Disabilities Act: Promises and Challenges, 27
U.S.F. L. REV. 149, 157 (1992) (“The equitable remedies for employment discrimination
available under Title VII and the ADA were expanded in cases of intentional discrimination (not
disparate impact cases) by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to include compensatory and punitive
damages and the right to a jury trial. Compensatory damages include future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, and other non-pecuniary
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production and proof differ for disparate treatment and disparate impact.
These differences suggest that “disparate impact is not merely a
surrogate proof method for intentional discrimination, but instead is a
distinct theory aimed more broadly at practices that disproportionately
burden protected groups, whether or not intent to discriminate is
present.”204
2. Implicit Bias
Another possible defense for Title VII’s disparate impact provision
against an Equal Protection challenge is that it serves a compelling
interest by remedying unconscious or implicit bias. Unconscious or
implicit bias is bias that occurs subconsciously, beyond our awareness
and control.205
This section describes the science of implicit social cognition, which
studies subconscious mental processes and the results of implicit bias
research. After a discussion of the implications of implicit bias in the
workplace and the magnitude and pervasiveness of implicit bias, this
section explains why disparate impact might be needed to remedy
implicit bias. Additionally, this section examines the reliability of
implicit bias research and whether disparate impact can serve to correct
implicit bias. Finally, this section concludes that disparate impact’s
reliance on racial classifications to correct implicit bias does not serve a
compelling interest because of the inconclusive results of implicit bias
studies and contradictory interpretations of those studies.
a. The Science of Implicit Social Cognition
Studies show that bias occurs without our awareness. The science of
implicit social cognition “examines those mental processes that operate
without conscious awareness or conscious control but nevertheless
influence fundamental evaluations of individuals and groups.”206
Implicit social cognition science describes stereotypes and biases as a
result of human cognitive processing that categorizes persons and
experiences in order to make sense of the information encountered

losses. Punitive damages are authorized if the employer acted with malice or with reckless
indifference.”).
204. Sullivan, supra note 43, at 1524.
205. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987) (noting that hidden prejudice has become
the prevalent form of racism as society increasingly rejects racial prejudice as immoral and
unproductive).
206. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Symposium on Behavioral Realism: Fair Measures: A
Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).

NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC

2010]

Battling for a Compelling Interest

12/3/2010 11:47:58 AM

37

daily.207 Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger explains, “Categories and
categorization permit us to identify objects, make predictions about the
future, infer the existence of unobservable traits or properties, and
attribute the causation of events. . . . Categories are guardians against
complexity.”208 As Professor Charles Lawrence first brought to light in
his seminal work, stereotypes and biases are the result of the normal
process of categorization that takes place at the subconscious level.209
The cognitive bias theory posits that biases210 are cognitive, not
motivational, and occur without our self-awareness. Consequently,
biases can be “both unintentional and unconscious.”211

207. McGinley, supra note 200, at 423.
208. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1189 (1995).
209. See Lawrence, supra note 205, at 337 (“Cognitivists see the process of ‘categorization’
as one common source of racial and other stereotypes. All humans tend to categorize in order to
make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each one
on an individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope.”); see also Krieger, supra note 208, at
1188 (“To function at all, we must design strategies for simplifying the perceptual environment
and acting on less-than-perfect information. A major way we accomplish both goals is by creating
categories.”).
210. Implicit bias or cognitive bias theory originates from the science of implicit social
cognition. To aid the exploration of this theory, it is necessary to set out a few definitions.
The terms “stereotyping,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination,” as used in psychology,
refer to different aspects of category-based reactions to people from groups perceived
to differ significantly from one’s own. Stereotyping is generally understood as the
cognitive component of these category-based reactions: the part arising from and
relating to the thought process, by which we process information and assign meaning
to experience. Prejudice is a term with a fairly broad range of meanings; as used in the
social-psychological literature, it can refer either to a subject’s immediate emotional
response to a target group (e.g., pity, anger, fear), or to the attitudes or beliefs that
result from this response (e.g., contempt, inferiority). [Prejudice] refer[s] to the
affective, or emotional, component of these reactions: how one feels about a member
of a different group, or about that group generally. In order to distinguish between the
two potential meanings, [bias] refer[s] to the attitudes and beliefs that result from
affective prejudice . . . . Discrimination refers to how people implement their
stereotypic thoughts and prejudicial feelings in dealing with members of different
groups: refusing to hire them, marry them, speak to them, etc.
Elizabeth E. Theran, “Free to Be Arbitrary and . . . Capricious”: Weight-Based Discrimination
and the Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 11 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 116–17
(2001) (alteration in original). For other definitions of “bias,” “prejudice,” and “discrimination,”
see Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1035–40 (2006).
Additionally, it is helpful to understand the distinction between motive and intent: “Motive is
what prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state of mind with which the
act is done or omitted.” Krieger, supra note 208, at 1171 (citing Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d
1063, 1066 (7th Cir. 1989)).
211. Krieger, supra note 208, at 1188. For additional discussion of implicit bias, see Samuel
R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
477 (2007) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Implicit Bias]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and
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The study of social implicit cognition has broad implications when
applied to employment. Employers operating on biases are “not
necessarily withholding their ‘true’ attitudes and beliefs but rather . . .
they are unable to know the contents of their mind.”212 If people are
unaware of their biases, then discrimination resulting from cognitive
biases can occur in the workplace without the decision maker’s
awareness.
Professor Jerry Kang points out that “the presence of implicit bias
can produce discrimination by causing the very basis of evaluation,
merit, to be mismeasured.”213 For example, in one study by the Civil
Rights Investigations Project of the Legal Assistance Foundation of
Metropolitan Chicago, resumes of applicants with equivalent
qualifications and experience were sent to employers who had posted
job openings.214 The applicants were African-American and Caucasian
females; the race of the applicants was easily discernable from their
names and addresses that were provided on the resumes.215 The results
showed that Caucasian applicants were 21% more likely to be contacted
for an interview than their African-American counterparts.216 In
another component of the same study, when African-American
applicants with stronger qualifications applied in person, the Caucasian
applicants were 16% more likely to be offered the position.217
Additionally, the study showed differences in the wages being offered.
The employers offered Caucasian applicants an average of thirty-six
hours of work a week, which amounted to $16,600 per year, whereas
the African-American applicants received offers for twenty-eight hours
per week, amounting to $12,900 per year.218 This study illustrates the

the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
Structural Turn]; Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of
Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 1489 (2005); Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1063; Lawrence, supra note 205;
McGinley, supra note 200, at 417–18; Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 210.
212. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1071.
213. Id. at 1066.
214. Michael L. Foreman et al., The Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and
Programs in Integrating the Nation’s Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 87 & n.26
(2004) (citing LEEANN LODDER ET AL., CHI. URB. LEAGUE, RACIAL PREFERENCE AND
SUBURBAN EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES 2 (2003)). Similar research conducted in Boston and
Chicago by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan revealed similar biases for the
Caucasian applicants. Kang, supra note 211, at 1515–16.
215. Foreman, supra note 214, at 87.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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effects of discrimination on the “mismeasurement” of qualifications and
merit.
The susceptibility to unconscious bias reaches beyond employers,
though employers are most relevant to the present discussion. The
Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) demonstrated that the magnitude and
pervasiveness of bias219 reach all groups. The IAT measured “groupvalence and group-trait associations that underlie attitudes and
stereotypes.”220 Since the availability of the IAT in 1998221 for the
public to self-administer via the Internet,222 researchers have collected
data from over three million tests from individuals who have visited the
IAT website.223 The studies measured the extent of participants’
unconsciously-held biases against outwardly-expressed biases that they
self-reported. The IAT showed that not only did people have an
implicit bias against traditionally disadvantaged groups,224 but also that
they have greater implicit bias in favor of the advantaged group.225
Americans held implicit biases against “Blacks, Latinos, Jews, Asians,
non-Americans, women, gays, and the elderly.”226 Additionally, this
implicit bias against socially disadvantaged groups was not limited to
Americans but extended to populations in other countries.227 In sum,
the IAT revealed that regardless of their race or where they live, people
are unaware of their preference for or against a particular social group.

219. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 211, at 966 (concluding the “pervasiveness of implicit
bias . . . was clearly demonstrated by the data”).
220. Id. at 952.
221. Id. at 955.
222. The IAT can be taken at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
223. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1072.
224. The “disadvantaged” groups consisted of the following categories: “AfricanAmerican[s],” “Asians,” “Canadian[s],” those from “foreign places,” “gay people,” “Muslims,”
“old people,” the “poor,” “fat people,” and those from “Japan.” Greenwald & Krieger, supra note
211, at 957.
225. Id. at 955. Professor Kang describes numerous other fascinating studies, such as the
math test, shooter bias test, and resume test, that all indicate implicit bias. Kang, supra note 211,
at 1515–29.
226. Kang, supra note 211, at 1512.
227. Id.
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Specifically, the Race IAT228 found a significant discrepancy
between the amount of preference people openly acknowledged for
certain racial groups through surveys and the implicit bias they
unconsciously held.229 A central finding in these studies is that most
people were implicitly biased in favor of European-Americans over
African-Americans.230 Only among African-Americans was there an
equal implicit bias for European-Americans and African-Americans
alike.231 Strikingly, the IAT showed that even among AfricanAmericans, there is significant lack of awareness of their own
favoritism toward European-Americans despite their outward
expressions of preference for their own race.232
What are the implications of the IAT for real world behavior? Some
scholars conclude that “implicit bias plays a causal role in
discrimination”233 and implicit bias measured by the IAT is predictive
of discriminatory behavior.234
228. In the Race IAT, the program presents faces for the participants to identify as EuropeanAmerican or African-American. Next, participants identify which among the words presented are
pleasant-meaning, as opposed to unpleasant-meaning. Then, the participant distinguishes among
the categories in random order. The participant is instructed to respond by pressing a particular
key when African-American faces or pleasant words appear, and to press another key when
European-American faces or unpleasant words appear. This same exercise is completed for
European-American faces and pleasant words, which requires pressing a different key than when
the participant sees African-American faces or unpleasant words. Greenwald & Krieger, supra
note 211, at 952–53. The IAT measures the speed of the responses. The speed with which a
person responds to a particular pairing (e.g., European-American with pleasant words) shows the
strength of preference for that association. The Race IAT shows a quicker response time among
American participants when European-American faces are paired with pleasant words, indicating
a stronger association than when African-American faces are paired with pleasant words. Id. at
953.
229. Approximately 40% of Caucasian participants outwardly expressed a preference in favor
of European-Americans, but the IAT showed that 71.5% of Caucasians actually held an implicit
bias in favor of European-Americans. Id. at 958.
230. See id. (highlighting that 60.5% of Hispanics and 67.5% of Asian and Pacific Islanders
held an implicit bias toward European-Americans).
231. See id. (showing that 34.1% of African-Americans implicitly favored other AfricanAmericans, while 32.4% held an implicit bias in favor of European-Americans).
232. The IAT revealed that the implicit bias of African-Americans in favor of EuropeanAmericans was significantly higher than explicitly reported on surveys. Only 4.8% of AfricanAmericans explicitly reported being favorably biased in favor of European-Americans, but the
IAT showed 32.4% of African-Americans were biased in favor of European-Americans. Id.
233. Id. at 966.
234. See id. (noting there is a substantial and actively accumulating body of evidence that
supports this assertion); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997,
1034 (2006) (explaining how subtle forms of bias “can latently distort” information on which
employment decisions are based); Kang, supra note 211, at 1514 (asserting that the IAT
accurately predicts disparate behavior even when one explicitly self-reports a commitment to
racial equality).
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b. Disparate Impact as a Remedy for Implicit Bias
If implicit bias results in discrimination, one compelling interest for
the disparate impact provision’s racial classifications may be its ability
to correct implicit bias. Disparate impact is needed because disparate
treatment is inadequate to address implicit bias. Disparate treatment’s
ability to remedy implicit bias is theoretically and practically limited by
its centering liability on intent.235 A focus on employer intent236—the
state of mind of the employer when the discriminatory act is done—
presumes that employers are cognizant of their discrimination.237 Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins238 is illustrative of this presumption. In this sex
discrimination case, the Court evaluated the sufficiency of the evidence
in establishing that sexual stereotyping played a role in the employer’s
evaluation of the employee’s candidacy for partnership. Justice
Brennan stated:

235. The Court in Watson recognized the limitation of disparate treatment. See Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (“[E]ven if one assumed that any such
discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of
subconscious stereotypes and prejudices would remain.”). Many scholars have also noted this
limitation of disparate treatment as a remedy for employers’ implicit bias. See, e.g., Green, supra
note 39, at 119 (“[J]udicial responses in the individual disparate treatment context illustrate the
inadequacy of a conception of discrimination that focuses on a particular decisionmaker’s state of
mind at a discrete point in time to address the subtle, ongoing operation of discriminatory bias
common in the modern workplace.”); Krieger, supra note 208, at 1213 (explaining that Wilson v.
Stroh, 9 F.2d 942 (6th Cir.1992), illustrates this shortfall, because although the plaintiff proved
that his immediate supervisor’s conduct was motivated by racial animus, he could not prove that
the ultimate decisionmaker was racially motivated, and therefore lost); Lawrence, supra note 205,
at 322 (“Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional—in the sense
that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker’s beliefs, desires, and
wishes.”); McGinley, supra note 200, at 417–18 (cautioning against how oversimplifying the
definition of intent distorts the current nature of prejudice and how it results in discriminatory
behavior).
236. Some courts have applied a strict interpretation of intent: “Discrimination is about actual
knowledge, and real intent, not constructive knowledge and assumed intent.” Silvera v. Orange
Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 800 (11th Cir. 2000)); see also Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir.
1992) (“Racial discrimination is an intentional wrong. An empty head means no discrimination.
There is no ‘constructive intent,’ and constructive knowledge does not show actual intent.”).
237. Professor Charles Lawrence points out that “[b]y insisting that a blameworthy perpetrator
be found before the existence of racial discrimination can be acknowledged, the Court creates an
imaginary world where discrimination does not exist unless it was consciously intended.”
Lawrence, supra note 205, at 324–25; see also Krieger, supra note 208, at 1213
(“Decisionmaking is not . . . structurally disjoined from those perceptual and inferential processes
which compromise it.”).
238. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)).
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In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response,
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a
woman. In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that
she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.239

The Court conceptualized a framework for disparate treatment liability
that rests not just on showing that an employer treated an employee
differently, but that the employer took such actions because of the
employee’s race or other traits—in other words, that the employer was
aware of its own motives. If, according to social cognition studies,
people are unconscious of their biases when they act, it would be
difficult to use employer intent as a method of counteracting implicit
bias.240
On the other hand, disparate impact is not restrained by intent and
may be a more appropriate mechanism for correcting the discriminatory
effects of implicit bias. One way disparate impact may mute the effects
of implicit bias is by increasing diversity within the workforce. Some
studies support the conclusion that the level of implicit bias may be
reduced by diversity.241 The evidence shows that implicit bias can be
affected merely by exposing an IAT participant to another person of a
different race in the room.242 In one study, IAT participants took the
test with an African-American experimenter in the room and took the
test at another time with a Caucasian experimenter in the room.243 The
presence of the African-American experimenter rather than the
Caucasian experimenter reduced the level of implicit bias.244 Another
study measured the effect of pairing test takers with different racial
partners.245 Caucasian IAT participants who were paired with an
African-American partner showed less implicit bias than when paired

239. Id.
240. Professor David Oppenheimer has proposed a theory of negligent discrimination for
employer liability resulting from unconscious stereotyping. See generally David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (proposing that an
employer would be held liable under the negligent supervision theory for failing to take
reasonable steps to prevent discrimination, knowing or having reason to know it is occurring, or
expecting it or having reason to expect it to occur).
241. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 211, at 981 (specifying that presence of population
diversity in an environment will reduce the implict bias).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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with a Caucasian partner.246 This body of evidence from the IAT
supports the inference that diversity in the workplace might similarly
reduce the level of implicit bias.
c. Problems with the Rationale that Disparate Impact Can Remedy
Implicit Bias
Disparate impact must overcome several hurdles to justify its use of
racial classifications as a remedy for implicit bias. First, studies about
implicit bias are not conclusive because there are doubts about the
validity of the IAT and the effectiveness of disparate impact to address
implicit bias. The IAT is played out like a tennis match in the scholarly
arena where scholars lob the IAT results back and forth. Some scholars
are persuaded by the findings of the IAT, while others like Professors
Gregory Mitchell and Philip Tetlock challenge the construct and the
internal and external validity of the IAT, as well as the interpretations of
IAT results.247 Professors Mitchell and Tetlock argue that “[t]he
explicit measures of prejudice used in most construct validation studies
are themselves politically controversial—and open to alternative
explanations. For instance, measures of modern, symbolic, and aversive
racism often include items that could easily serve as measures of
ideological conservatism, traditional values, and the Protestant work
ethic.”248 A high IAT score can be explained as reflecting empathy for
a social group, performance anxiety of being characterized racist, or
awareness of social stereotypes, rather than inwardly held animus.249
Differences in IAT scores may also be the result of mental flexibility in
adapting to the changes in testing instructions and hand-eye
coordination.250
Mitchell and Tetlock caution against making
conclusions about IAT scores based on differences of milliseconds.251
They point out that while studies have confirmed a correlation between
implicit bias and “micro-level” behaviors, such as body language and
facial expressions, few can link implicit bias with “macro-level”
behaviors such as engaging in discriminatory employment practices.252
On the other hand, notwithstanding “some effective points” made by
Mitchell and Tetlock, Professor Samuel Bagenstos finds redeeming

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 210, at 1031–34.
Id. at 1064.
Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1089–90.
Id. at 1046–47.
Id. at 1051.
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arguments for applying discrimination law to implicit bias.253 Professor
Bagenstos explains, “Although they ostensibly attack the ‘science’ of
implicit bias research, Mitchell and Tetlock’s real target is the
normative view of antidiscrimination law as reaching beyond acts
reflecting individual fault of the discriminator.”254 Professor Bagenstos
concludes that regardless of what implicit bias truly reflects, whether
animus or empathy or other explanations, the consequence is that it
limits opportunities for racial groups.255 He argues, “The point of
antidiscrimination law, however, is not to identify and punish prejudice
as an inherent personal quality. The point is to prevent and provide
remedies for conduct that deprive minorities of opportunities.”256
Consistent with Professor Bagenstos’s recommendation that conduct
that limits opportunities for racial groups should be prevented, some
scholars suggest remedies for implicit bias such as removing stereotype
threats, increasing self-awareness of implicit biases, cloaking social
categories, and employing debiasing agents.257 Stereotype threat is the
phenomenon that occurs when people who belong to social groups with
negative stereotypes about particular capabilities underperform when
they are reminded of their group identity.258 For example, in one
experiment, researchers gave a verbal test to African-American and
Caucasian participants.259 When the participants were told that the test
measured their intellectual capabilities, the African-American
participants underperformed compared with the Caucasian
participants.260 With another group of participants, the researchers told
them that the test was merely a laboratory task.261 In this situation,
there was no significant difference between performance of the
Caucasian and African-American participants.262 Studies on stereotype
threats showed that this phenomenon negatively affected the
performance of African-Americans on intellectual tests, women on math
tests, the elderly on memory tests, and people of low socio-economic
status on verbal tests.263 Cloaking social categories involves the

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, supra note 211, at 479.
Id. at 480–81.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 487.
Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1101–15.
Id. at 1087.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1088.
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removal of any identification of social group membership, such as
names and pictures.264 A debiasing agent is a person who helps to
break down racial stereotypes265 by having characteristics counter to the
stereotypes associated with the person’s social group membership:
“women construction workers, male nurses, Black intellectuals, White
janitors, Asian CEOs, gay boxers, and elderly marathon runners.”266
However, while these strategies may combat implicit bias, it remains
to be seen how they relate to disparate impact. Disparate impact does
not rely on these strategies. In fact, even if an employer were to utilize
all these strategies, an employer could still be at risk for disparate
impact liability. For example, if an employer eliminates stereotype
threats and cloaks social categories by removing the test taker’s identity
on an employment test, an employer would find itself defending against
a disparate impact suit if the test results had a disproportionately
adverse effect on a racial group. This, therefore, leads to the question,
how does disparate impact mitigate implicit bias? In the prior
hypothetical, it seems that disparate impact would not serve the purpose
of detecting bias. If detecting and mitigating implicit bias were to be a
compelling purpose for disparate impact, it is necessary to first show the
relationship between implicit bias and unconscious discriminatory acts
and then show how disparate impact can be utilized to correct implicit
bias. The studies do not provide a definitive answer.
Additionally, others have found that disparate impact is theoretically
and practically flawed as a device to provide adequate relief against bias
in the workplace267 and opportunities for minorities. Professor Tristin
Green explains, “[D]isparate impact theory conceptualizes
discrimination solely at the institutional level, neglecting an exploration
of the interplay between institutional choices and the operation of
discriminatory bias in individuals and groups at multiple levels of
interaction in the workplace.”268 The failure of disparate impact theory,
according to Professor Green, results from focusing on a “purely
structural account of discrimination,” rather than on how the structure,
systems, and dynamics of institutions contribute to discriminatory
bias.269

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1112.
Id. at 1109.
Green, supra note 39, at 136.
Id. at 138.
Id.
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d. Summary
The ambivalence among scholars about the validity of implicit bias
tests, the interpretations of that research, and the role of disparate
impact in providing relief for implicit bias are problematic to defending
use of racial classification in disparate impact to combat unconscious
bias. Operating on the assumption that disparate impact relies on racial
classification, the Supreme Court is unlikely to sustain the use of a
“highly suspect tool” such as racial classification without conclusive
evidence that it serves a compelling purpose.270 The inconclusive
nature of the research may be the Achilles’ heel to justifying the use of
disparate impact to mitigate implicit bias as a compelling interest.
Additionally, the Court is unlikely to respond to using
antidiscrimination law to redress unconscious bias in which everyone
engages. Professor Bagenstos points out:
If antidiscrimination law is to respond to such bias effectively, the
concept of wrongful discrimination must expand to embrace not only
the deviant acts of especially immoral people but also the everyday
actions of virtually all of us. In the end, because implicit biases draw
on widely shared cultural understandings, any effort to eliminate those
biases requires a massive, society-wide effort to change the
significance of race and gender in our culture. Courts are likely to balk
at undertaking such a colossal task; they are particularly unlikely to
conclude that particular employers are at fault for failing to police
conduct that has been programmed into our brains by overarching
societal influences.271

C. Diversity
Another rationale for the disparate impact provision’s use of racial
classifications is that it is necessary to attain a diverse workforce. This
270. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989) (striking down the
city’s Minority Business Utilization Plan because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest justifying the plan, which was not narrowly tailored to remedy the effects
of prior discrimination).
271. Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 211, at 42–43. Additionally, Professor Barbara
Flagg points out:
To hold both unconscious and conscious race discrimination equally blameworthy is
also unlikely to produce desirable consequences. First, blaming individuals for
unconsciously held attitudes may produce paralyzing guilt when the racist character of
those attitudes comes to light. Furthermore, condemning the individual for matters not
within his conscious control seems inconsistent with the very concept of
blameworthiness. Finally, assessing blame for what, in effect, nearly every white
person does seems equally incongruous.
Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement
of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 989 (1993).
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section explores the contexts in which achieving diversity is compelling
and if that rationale can be extended to employment. Specifically, this
section discusses the Supreme Court’s response to the diversity
rationale, benefits of diversity, and limitations of the diversity rationale
to the workplace.
1. Diversity Rationale Recognized by the Supreme Court
a. Bakke
Diversity was first recognized as a compelling interest in Bakke.272
In Bakke, Justice Powell, who announced the judgment,273 considered
several justifications made by the school for its racially-based
admissions quota. First, the school asserted that the purpose of its
admissions policy was to “reduc[e] the historic deficit of traditionally
disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession,”
but Justice Powell rejected this as impermissible racial balancing that
would unnecessarily burden innocent parties.274 When the school
defended its program on the interest of “increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities underserved,” Justice
Powell also rejected this assertion due to the lack of evidence that the
program was designed to advance that interest. Finally, the Court
approved the school’s racial classification for the purpose of “obtaining
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
body.”275 Justice Powell’s approval of the “attainment of a diverse
student body” was premised on the academic freedom of institutions of
higher education, which has been traditionally understood to be
protected by the First Amendment.276 The Court espoused the view that
the “‘nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure’ to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of

272. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311 (1978) (plurality opinion).
273. The Grutter Court observed:
The [Bakke] decision produced six separate opinions, none of which commanded a
majority of the Court. Four Justices would have upheld the program against all attack
on the ground that the government can use race to “remedy disadvantages cast on
minorities by past racial prejudice.” Four other Justices avoided the constitutional
question altogether and struck down the program on statutory grounds.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 322 (2003) (reflecting upon the divided opinions of the Bakke
Court).
274. Id. at 323–24 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306–07).
275. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
276. Id. at 311–12.

NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC

48

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

12/3/2010 11:47:58 AM

[Vol. 42

many peoples”277 and reasoned that the medical school’s admissions
program would promote a “robust exchange of ideas.”278
b. Grutter
Following Bakke, Grutter reaffirmed that diversity could be a
compelling interest.279 In Grutter, the law school’s justification for
considering race in its admissions procedure was for the singular
purpose of “obtaining ‘the educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body.’”280 The law school sought to enroll a “critical mass of
underrepresented minority students.”281 The school did not define
diversity solely based on race or ethnicity and allowed for consideration
of other factors.282
In defining critical mass, the school stated that it did not focus on a
particular number or percentage but on attaining “‘meaningful numbers’
or ‘meaningful representation,’ . . . a number that encourages
underrepresented minority students to participate in the classroom and
not feel isolated.”283 The purpose of attaining a diverse student body,
as the law school explained, was not remedial, but to promote “crossracial understanding [to help] break down racial stereotypes, . . . enable
students to better understand persons of different races,” and engender
“livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and interesting”
classroom discussions.284
Grutter unequivocally repudiated the belief that only an interest in
remedying past discrimination could survive strict scrutiny and held that
an interest in attaining a diverse student body was a compelling
purpose.285 Although the Court employed strict scrutiny, it afforded the
law school deference in the determination that diversity was necessary
to the educational functions of the school286: “We have long recognized
that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university
environment, universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional

277. Id. at 313.
278. Id. The Court found that diversity was a compelling interest but invalidated the program
because it was not narrowly tailored. Id. at 267.
279. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 316 (internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted).
282. Id.
283. Id. at 318 (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. at 330 (internal quotation marks and original alterations omitted).
285. Id. at 328.
286. Id.
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tradition.”287 The Court embraced the rationale previously stated in
Bakke that, consistent with the First Amendment contours of academic
freedom, a university’s educational prerogatives include the “selection
of its student body.”288 The Court summarized its reasoning as follows:
“Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a
diverse student body is . . . at the heart of the Law School’s proper
institutional mission, and that ‘good faith’ on the part of a university is
‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to the contrary.’”289
c. Parents Involved
Finally, in Parents Involved, the Court firmly established the
boundaries of the diversity rationale previously embraced in Grutter. In
Parents Involved, the Court rejected the school district’s use of diversity
as a compelling interest to justify the district’s racially based method of
school assignments. The district contended that assigning students to
schools based on race “help[ed] to reduce racial concentration in
schools and to ensure that racially concentrated housing patterns do not
prevent nonwhite students from having access to the most desirable
schools.”290 The “school district[s] argue[d] that educational and
broader socialization benefits flow from a racially diverse learning
environment, and . . . because the diversity they seek is racial
diversity—not the broader diversity at issue in Grutter—it makes sense
to promote that interest directly by relying on race alone.”291 The Court
concluded, however, that the racially based assignments were not
narrowly tailored to achieve the educational and social benefits sought
by the districts because the “plans [were] tied to each district’s specific
racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level
of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits.”292
2. The Benefits of Diversity
a. Intrinsic or Extrinsic Value of Diversity
In the three foregoing cases, the Court endorsed diversity as a
compelling interest, with some limitations. But why is diversity
important? Is diversity a thing of value in and of itself or merely an

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 329.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725 (2007).
Id. at 725–26.
Id. at 726.
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instrument that brings about favorable consequences?293
These
questions can be answered by considering a hypothetical. Assume that
the students who were educated in the diverse environment at the law
school in Grutter graduated and each decided to live as hermits on a
secluded island in total isolation. The benefits of having cross-racial
understanding and a robust exchange of ideas from their diverse
education are of little use to these students as they live in seclusion.
This example illustrates that diversity has extrinsic value, as opposed to
unconditional, intrinsic value.294 The compelling nature of diversity is
reliant on how it can benefit the students’ chosen profession or their
societal interactions with others.295 If students were to become hermits,
the diverse education would be of little benefit to society. The value of
diversity stems from its usefulness outside of the classroom; otherwise,
diversity would be merely useful as an academic exercise at the
university. Therefore, the value of diversity in the workplace must be
evaluated at an extrinsic level.
b. Business Case for Diversity
A possible defense for the disparate impact provision is that its use of
racial classification is necessary for obtaining the benefits flowing from
diversity for public and private employers. Relying on “expert studies
and reports,” the Grutter Court concluded that “student body diversity
promotes learning outcomes, and better prepares students for an
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as
professionals.”296 Additionally, the Court endorsed the concept that
“[t]hese benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American
businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely
diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”297 The Court also
accepted the assertions of military leaders that a “highly qualified,

293. See Patrick S. Shin, Diversity v. Colorblindness, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1188–89
(2009) (discussing that the social good flowing from racial diversity is not intrinsic or
unconditional, but rather extrinsic, depending on the particular conditions and circumstances in
which it is present).
294. Id.
295. See Pamela S. Karlan, Compelling Interests/Compelling Institutions: Law Schools as
Constitutional Litigants, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1625 (2007) (pointing out the “concrete nature
of the [Grutter] Court’s discussion of the way that racially diverse student bodies contribute to
the extrinsic function of producing members of leadership professions”).
296. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
297. Id.
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racially diverse officer corps is essential to the military’s ability to
fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.”298
In Justice Scalia’s dissent in Grutter, he pointed out that the benefits
that the university sought through enrolling a diverse student population
are “lesson[s] of life”299 and that employers could equally insist on
using racial classifications to teach these same civic lessons in
“socialization and good citizenship” to their employees.300 Although
Justice Scalia was being ironic, the question of whether diversity could
be equally compelling in the employment context is worth examining
because the Supreme Court has not reviewed a case that advances
diversity in an employment decision. Taxman v. Board of Education of
Township of Piscataway301 would have been the test case, but the
parties settled months before oral arguments were scheduled before the
Supreme Court.302 The issue in Taxman centered on the school board
invoking its affirmative action program to layoff a Caucasian teacher
rather than an African-American teacher who was equal in seniority.303
Although the statistics showed that African-Americans were not
underrepresented in the school system’s workforce,304 the school board
retained the African-American teacher because she was the only
African-American teacher in the Business Education Department.305
The school board justified its layoff decision based on cultural diversity:
[The educational objective] was sending a very clear message that we
feel that our staff should be culturally diverse, our student population
is culturally diverse and there is a distinct advantage to students, to all
students, to be made—come into contact with people of different
cultures, different background, so that they are more aware, more
tolerant, more accepting, more understanding of people of all
background.306

Although the Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to review the
Taxman case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the diversity
argument and held that Title VII only permits remedial programs.307

298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 331 (original alteration omitted).
Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
Id. at 348.
91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117 (1997).
Foreman, supra note 214, at 98 nn.114–15.
Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
Id. at 1550.
Id. at 1551.
Id. at 1552.
Id. at 1567.
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Diversity has been touted by corporations for increasing productivity
through the improvement of intra-office dynamics, facilitating unique
problem solving approaches, and improving the delivery of services and
development of products for a diverse customer base.308 The following
discussion will evaluate if the benefits attributable to diversity are
applicable outside of the classrooms of higher education institutions and
if there are any limitations to extending the diversity rationale to the
employment context.
3. Critiquing the Diversity Rationale as Applied to Employment
a. Similarity to Racial Balancing
Advancing disparate impact as a method of promoting diversity may
be vulnerable to an attack that it is an attempt to achieve racial
balancing. The Court has reiterated that “racial balance is not to be
achieved for its own sake.”309 In Parents Involved, the Court rejected
any attempt to disguise racial balancing as racial diversity or racial
integration: “Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it
‘racial diversity.’”310 Lower courts have similarly construed the
objective of ameliorating under-representation as an effort to relabel
racial balancing.311
Courts might suspect disparate impact as an effort to achieve racial
balancing because of disparate impact’s focus on racial proportions in
the applicant pool. Disparate impact necessitates a comparison of the
representative numbers among each racial group.
In essence,
application of the four-fifths rule means that there must be a
representation in the smallest racial group of at least 80% of the largest
racial group selected. The failure to attain this proportion in the

308. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental Affirmative Action: Law
and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 682–83 (2004) (discussing
affirmative action and the use of bona fide occupational qualifications in society and in law,
focusing on policing, education, business, and voting rights); Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as
Mission Critical: The Occupational Need Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond,
113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1129 (2004) (surveying the various amicus filings in Grutter that concern the
occupational benefits of racial diversity in a business environment).
309. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729 (2007)
(original alteration omitted) (citation omitted).
310. Id. at 732.
311. See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Underrepresentation
is merely racial balancing in disguise—another way of suggesting that there be optimal
proportions for the representation of races and ethnic groups . . . .”).
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applicant pool subjects employers to defending against a prima facie
case of disparate impact.
b. Limited to the Context of Higher Education
Another substantial hurdle for disparate impact is persuading the
Court that considerations of diversity should be extended beyond higher
education. As Justice O’Connor stated, “Context matters.”312 In
Parents Involved, the Court emphasized that it upheld the use of racial
classification in Grutter because of the unique circumstances of
institutions of higher education.313 In the Court’s analysis, due to “the
expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the
university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our
constitutional tradition.”314 Justice Roberts chastised the lower courts
for disregarding the expressed limitation of the Court’s holding “to the
unique context of higher education” in Grutter.315
If elementary and secondary schools failed to persuade the Court to
apply Grutter even within the educational context—albeit not higher
education—it is not realistic to think that the Court will accept a
diversity argument in the employment context. Additionally, in the
employment context, there is no constitutional principle that must be
counterbalanced with the prohibition against racial classification that
would justify extending diversity beyond higher education. In the
educational context, the Court articulated sensitivity to the First
Amendment considerations unique to universities. No such unique
considerations exist in the employment context. It is unlikely, therefore,
that the Court will extend the diversity argument beyond the context of
higher education.
At least one lower court has rejected an attempt to apply the diversity
rationale outside the classroom. In Lomack v. City of Newark, the Third
Circuit rejected the city’s race-based transfers of firefighters for
“creat[ing] a rainbow at each firehouse.”316 The city argued that
integrating its fire companies led to increased camaraderie, sharing of
information, and support.317
The court found this argument
312. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003).
313. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 725.
314. Id. at 724 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329).
315. Id. at 725 (“The Court in Grutter expressly articulated key limitations on its holding—
defining a specific type of broad-based diversity and noting the unique context of higher
education—but these limitations were largely disregarded by the lower courts in extending
Grutter to uphold race-based assignments in elementary and secondary schools.”).
316. 463 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 2006).
317. Id. at 309.
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unpersuasive because while the benefits attributable to diversity were
important to the educational mission of academic institutions, they were
not central to firefighting.318
c. Studies Provide Mixed Results Regarding Benefits of Diversity
Related to the issue of whether the diversity rationale can be
extended beyond the higher education context is whether using diversity
in the workplace produces benefits sufficient to justify the disparate
impact provision’s use of racial classifications. If the Court were to
extend diversity beyond higher education, there must be a showing that
the social good flowing from diversity that benefits education would
also benefit businesses. The following discussion evaluates whether
diversity in the workplace can increase efficiency and profits by
enhancing inter-office cooperation and breaking down stereotypes.
i. Increasing Efficiency and Profits
Studies show mixed results about the benefits of diversity in the
workplace.319 Some studies find that diversity has a positive effect in
the employment context.320
Psychological research shows that
heterogeneous groups offer more creative solutions to problems.321
On the other hand, other studies show that diversity has no effect—or
worse, a negative effect—at work.322 Research by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology’s Sloan School of Management found that
“racial and gender diversity do[es] not have the positive effect on
performance proposed by those with a more optimistic view of the role
diversity can play in organizations.”323 Some research suggested that

318. Id. at 310.
319. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 1, 84 & n.348 (2000).
320. Allan G. King & Jeremy W. Hawpe, Gratz v. Grutter: Lessons for Pursuing Diversity in
the Workplace, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 41, 59 (2004).
321. Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 127,
135 (2000).
322. In terms of national costs, studies show that the goal of advancing affirmative action has
had a negative effect. See Jared M. Mellott, Note, The Diversity Rationale for Affirmative Action
in Employment After Grutter: The Case for Containment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1091, 1155
n.335 (2006) (describing the study of two economists who estimated that “affirmative action
caused businesses to lose $225 billion annually in direct, indirect, and opportunity costs” and
another study that “estimate[d] that affirmative action in public contracting with private
businesses cost the taxpayers approximately $2 billion in 2004, based on the higher bids
submitted by minority subcontracting firms that primary contractors are induced to accept”).
323. King & Hawpe, supra note 320, at 58 (quoting Thomas Kochan et al., The Effect of
Diversity on Business Performance: Report of the Diversity Research Network, 42 HUM. RES.
MGMT. 3, 17 (2003)).
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whether diversity increases productivity depends on the group members
buying in to the value of diversity.324 If groups do not value diversity
as enhancing their work, “diverse groups are less likely to benefit from
their diversity and may even perform less well than homogeneous
groups that do not have to negotiate the kinds of conflict and
communication issues that often beset diverse groups.”325 While group
diversity may broaden the “range of ideas considered and of alternatives
generated,”326 group diversity may also produce “lower levels of
satisfaction and commitment, lower performance evaluations for those
who are different, and high levels of absenteeism and turnover.”327
Overall, the research concluded that “diversity is most likely to impede
group functioning.”328
ii. Breaking Down Stereotypes
Additionally, research showed mixed results regarding whether
diversity can break down stereotypes by increasing contact with
individuals of different social groups. As described earlier, one study
showed that when Caucasian IAT participants are paired with an
African-American partner, or take the test with an African-American
experimenter in the room, their implicit bias is reduced.329
Another study, however, showed an opposite result. In that study,
participants played a video game in which the objective was to shoot
persons who were armed with a gun.330 The game flashed images of
Caucasians or African-Americans; in these images, the persons were
either holding a gun or a harmless object.331 The participants more
often shot the African-American, believing the person to be armed when
he was not, and they more often failed to shoot the Caucasian whom
they mistakenly believed was unarmed when he was actually armed.332
Strikingly, both African-American and Caucasian participants had
“shooter bias” against African-Americans, and the “shooter bias” was
324. David B. Wilkins, Symposium: Brown at Fifty, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal”
to “Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate
of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1587 (2004).
325. Id.
326. Estlund, supra note 319, at 27.
327. Id. at 28 (quoting Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O’Reilly III, Demography and
Diversity in Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 77, 116
(1998) (internal citations omitted)).
328. Id. (quoting Williams & O’Reilly, supra note 327, at 120).
329. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 211, at 981.
330. Kang & Banaji, supra note 206, at 1104.
331. Id.
332. Id.
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correlated to contacts with African-Americans.333 If the participants’
self-reports are true about their amount of contact with AfricanAmericans, then the study “shows that increased interracial contact
produces a greater tendency to ‘shoot’ African-Americans.”334
Professors Kang and Banaji concluded that “research supports the value
of intergroup contact to ameliorate negative attitudes (also called
‘prejudice’). However, intergroup contact may not counteract negative
stereotypes.”335 Thus, Professors Kang’s and Banaji’s conclusions
about the “shooter bias” study336 would appear to contradict the
assumption that increased diversity would lead to decreased stereotypes.
The contradictory results of the research on whether diversity increases
productivity and reduces stereotypes undermine the argument for
diversity as a compelling interest for disparate impact.
d. Benefits Accrue to Businesses, Not Individuals
Assuming arguendo that research supports the conclusion that
diversity reduces stereotypes in the workplace and fosters interracial
relations, one must pause to ask how that benefits the individual
employee.
While seemingly altruistic for advancing diversity,
businesses support diversity not to promote the cause of civil rights, but
to increase efficiency for the ultimate goal of increasing profits.337
Professor David Wilkins points out, “[N]ot every diverse viewpoint is
valued by corporate America. . . . Despite all the talk about fostering
multiple viewpoints, managers are interested only in ‘opinions about the
best way to build or sell cars or whatever other good is being produced
by the business.’”338 Businesses may not encourage diverse ideas that
are disruptive to maximizing the corporate bottom line, which in turn
may cause minorities to withhold their diverse expressions.
Consequently, this reinforces minorities’ perceptions that their diversity
matters little in the workforce.339

333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 1105.
336. I rely on the studies as presented by other scholars. An independent determination of the
reliability or validity of the studies is beyond my expertise and beyond the scope of this Article.
337. Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM.
J. SOC. 1589, 1591 (2001) (“[K]ey proponents of the new managerial model—managers and
management consultants—explicitly dissociate their efforts from civil rights law, arguing that
diversity is directly valuable to organizational efficiency and important in its own right rather
than because it might promote legal ideals.”).
338. Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1587–88 (quoting Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 573, 589 (2000)).
339. See id. (arguing that minorities with diverse viewpoints may not offer their divergent
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In contrast, in the educational context, the social goods asserted as
flowing from a diverse student population benefit the students directly.
If diversity does in fact foster cross-racial understanding by breaking
down racial stereotypes and promoting livelier and more enlightening
discussions in the classroom, students are the recipients of those
benefits. An argument can be made that the university is also the
recipient of benefits flowing from a diverse student body. A diverse
student body could improve the image of the school, which may impact
financial contributions to the university, attract desirable faculty who
might not otherwise consider working at the university, and attract
employers to recruit at the university. However, even conceding that
the university may be positively impacted from having a diverse student
body, those benefits are directly transferable to the students. The ability
to attract faculty and recruiters has a direct positive effect on students.
Contributions to the school can result in improved resources for
students and better facilities. Diversity is a compelling purpose in the
educational context because it is centered on the individual. On the
other hand, the rationale for increasing diversity in the workplace
appears to be employer-centered and is contrary to the focus of the
Equal Protection Clause and disparate impact provision on protecting
individuals.340 In the end, increasing corporate profit margins hardly
seems compelling.
An argument, however, could be made that the benefits accruing to
the employer, whether private or public, benefit the public at large. The
contributions of diversity, such as enhancement of interracial group
dynamics and creative thinking, help to improve the development of
products and delivery of services to the public. But even conceding this
argument, there is no direct benefit flowing to the diversity contributor;
in this regard, minorities who contribute diversity benefits can be seen
as a means to an end for public and private employers alike.
e. Leads to Stereotyping, Not Necessarily Viewpoint Diversity
Another concern with advancing diversity for the social good it
generates is the risk of perpetuating stereotypes. Although diversity is
extolled for its ability to break down stereotypes through increasing
contact between diverse groups, it may actually lead to stereotyping.
The law school in Grutter disavowed “its need for critical mass on ‘any
belief that minority students always (or even consistently) express some
opinions for fear of being perceived as too diverse).
340. For a discussion relating to the protection intended by the Equal Protection Clause, see
supra Part II.
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characteristic minority viewpoint on any issue.’”341
But the
justification that classroom discussions are livelier and more interesting
with a diverse group of students is premised on the notion, or even
expectation, that minorities will have a different viewpoint, or at least
different experiences, than nonminorities.
Professor Sanford Levinson offers a counter explanation:
Race and ethnicity, . . . at least on occasion, may act as proxies, not so
much for holding specific views, but for the probability of being
deeply interested (and at least somewhat knowledgeable) at all in
certain issues, i.e., those issues most germane to the group in question.
. . . African-Americans are more likely to be concerned with the
problems facing African-Americans—and, for that matter, more aware
of the complexities and divisions within the group of those comprising
the community of African-Americans—than are non-AfricanAmericans.342

But this explanation also seems to be premised on a stereotype—the
presumption that a person is more likely to be attuned to the matters
concerning that individual’s group.
A related concern is that the rationale for attaining critical mass of
diverse employees is similar to the racial isolation justification. Critical
mass, like the “racial isolation justification[,] is extremely suspect
because it assumes that [individuals] cannot function or express
themselves unless they are surrounded by sufficient number of persons
of like race or ethnicity.”343 This discussion serves as a reminder that
whether extolling diversity in the educational or employment context,
one must proceed with caution to not perpetuate the very stereotypes
that were intended to be mitigated.
f. Some Benefits of Robust Discussions Flowing from Diversity Apply
Only to Particular Contexts
An additional impediment to advancing the diversity rationale is that
the benefits of livelier discussions resulting from a diverse group may
be relevant to limited contexts. Assuming that diversity correlates with
diverse viewpoints, the richer discussions that emanate from diverse
groups would be useful to occupations in which group discussions are
central to the job at hand. For example, having a lively conversation
with diverse coworkers is unlikely to have much impact in the execution
341. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003) (quoting Brief for Respondent at 30,
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)).
342. Levinson, supra note 338, at 597.
343. Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 799 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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of a janitor’s duties. Robust discussions are largely relevant to jobs
involving problem-solving or where an exchange of ideas is helpful.
Even granting Professor Levinson’s point that diversity increases the
probability that there will be some who are deeply interested in issues
germane to their group membership, one wonders if this correlation is
relevant to other contexts. Would deep interest in matters concerning a
particular social group be relevant to a chemistry class discussion? Or
how would having an interest germane to an individual’s social group
apply in the workforce? Would the fact that African-Americans are
more concerned about issues facing African-Americans have any
application to a lone toll booth operator or an assembly-line factory
worker? Even if one conceptualizes diversity as having a likely
correlation of providing persons deeply interested in matters concerning
their racial group, this alternative conception may not be sufficient to
extend the application of the diversity rationale to the workplace.
g. Adverse Effects of Diversity in the Workplace
Finally, the last concern that the diversity rationale raises is that while
diversity is advanced for the social good that may flow from it, the
diversity rationale may have the unintended consequence of harming
minorities in some segments of the workforce. The diversity rationale
may lead employers who want to capitalize on the benefits of diversity
to exploit employees for a particular market, matching the employee to
the race of the clients.344 As one African-American lawyer explained:
“They expect you to know every black politician in the city and every
black businessman in the state.”345
Race matching results in
detrimental effects for some minorities because they may receive the
bulk of the undesirable assignments, be confined to niches, and have
limited opportunity to branch out.346 This effect is notable among
professionals like lawyers, doctors, and securities and financial agents,
whose jobs are dependent on developing clientele.347 In these
professions, African-Americans are more likely to be assigned to serve
344. Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1594; see also Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work:
A Title VII Critique of Constitutional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408, 1440–41 (2006)
(discussing that employers may segregate and exploit minority employees by assigning them to
serve minority communities).
345. Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determinants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U.
L. REV. 669, 743 (1997) (citation omitted).
346. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 344, at 1441; Wilkins, supra note 324, at 1595–98 (noting
that African-American lawyers are often engaged in practice areas where their race might be a
valuable credential).
347. Eric Grodsky & Devah Pager, The Structure of Disadvantage: Individual and
Occupational Determinants of the Black-White Wage Gap, 66 AM. SOC. REV. 542, 560 (2001).

NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC

60

12/3/2010 11:47:58 AM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 42

minority communities that are a less affluent client base.348 Therefore,
the diversity rationale has potential to cause unintended consequences
such as increasing racial stereotypes and restricting opportunities for
minorities, which may defeat the use of disparate impact to promote
diversity as a compelling interest.
D. Role Model
Another defense that may shield the disparate impact provision from
an Equal Protection Clause challenge is the rationale that the
provision’s use of racial classifications is necessary to provide role
models. A role model is someone whose behavior is emulated by
another.349 A role model is distinguishable from a mentor in several
respects. Those in a mentor-mentee relationship have a reciprocal
interest in each other that is personal.350 A role model differs because
the role model does not need to take an interest in the emulator and may
not even know the emulator personally.351 This section explores the
possibilities for applying a role model rationale in the workplace.
1. The Supreme Court’s Treatment of the Role Model Justification
a. Rejected in Wygant
The Court first considered the adequacy of the role model theory as
justification for racial classifications in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education.352 The school board defended its retention of a less senior
minority teacher because it sought to provide minority role models for
the minority students. The district court upheld the layoff procedures,
explaining that “[t]eachers are role-models for their students. More
specifically, minority teachers are role-models for minority students.
This is vitally important because societal discrimination has often
deprived minority children of other role-models.”353
The Supreme Court rejected the role model rationale as a means for
correcting societal discrimination.354 Additionally, the Court criticized
348. Id. at 561.
349. Adeno Addis, Role Models and the Politics of Recognition, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1377,
1389 (1996).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. 476 U.S. 267, 275–76 (1986).
353. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff’d, 746
F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), rev’d, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
354. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (“Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a
basis for imposing a racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the District
Court and the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness.”).
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the role model theory because it lacked a “logical stopping point” as it
permitted “discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point
required by any legitimate remedial purpose.”355 The Court was also
concerned that the role model theory could have the unintended
consequence of allowing employers to “escape” remedial obligations by
justifying its hiring of few African-American teachers on the low
enrollment of African-American students.356 The Court reasoned,
“Carried to its logical extreme, the idea that black students are better off
with black teachers could lead to the very system the Court rejected in
Brown v. Board of Education.”357
b. Accepted in Ambach v. Norwick
Although the Court has rejected the need to provide role models as a
justification for racial classifications, it has accepted the role model
justification for sustaining alienage classifications. In Ambach v.
Norwick, the Court upheld a prohibition against employing elementary
and secondary school teachers who lacked the intent to become United
States citizens.358 The Court’s holding rested on the belief that teachers
occupy a unique position to impart lessons in civics and citizenship.
The Court reasoned, “[A] teacher serves as a role model for his
students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions
and values . . . toward government, the political process, and a citizen’s
social responsibilities.”359
Wygant and Ambach would appear to be inconsistent, but there is
little that can be gleaned from Wygant about whether the Court would
regard teachers as proper role models. The Wygant Court invalidated
the role model justification because it was grounded in remedying
societal discrimination and was not narrowly tailored.360
2. Benefits of Providing Role Models
One seeks out a role model to aspire to achieve the role model’s level
of success in a given profession. One basis for the role model rationale
is that a role model of the same racial group as the emulator will
355. Id. at 275.
356. Id. at 276.
357. Id. (citation omitted).
358. 441 U.S. 68, 72–81 (1979).
359. Id. at 78–79.
360. Chief Judge Posner has opined that “[t]here are many weak arguments for discrimination,
and the ‘role model’ theory, at least to the extent that it has been developed in the cases to date, is
one, because of lack of substantiation and a well-nigh unlimited reach.” Wittmer v. Peters, 87
F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996).
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enhance the emulator’s ability to achieve. This theory has merit for
mentors and mentees because their relationship depends on their
comfort level with each other, which would affect the guidance that the
mentor imparts.361 However, there is no empirical evidence to support
the notion that a role model who shares the same racial background as
the emulator will have “qualitatively more influence” than someone of a
different race.362 Additionally, there is no evidence that shows an
emulator will achieve his or her goals better or faster with a role model
of the same race.363
Although there is a lack of empirical evidence to support the role
model theory, it may not be dispositive of whether the role model theory
should be applied in the workplace. In Ambach, there was no evidence
to support the Court’s inference that children are more receptive to civic
lessons that are taught, whether explicitly or implicitly, by teachers who
are United States citizens. Despite the lack of evidence, the Court
endorsed the role model theory in the context of alienage classifications.
Perhaps the reason for providing minorities with role models from
their racial group can be justified beyond consideration of empirical
evidence. Another justification for providing role models is the
following:
[G]iven the dearth of minorities and women in certain professions, it .
. . [is] necessary for aspiring minority and female role occupants to see
minorities and women in those roles to reassure themselves that they
can indeed occupy those roles and perform those functions and to
show them how those who share similarly historical and institutional
vulnerabilities can best occupy, perform in, and redefine those
roles.364

This theory conceptualizes the role model as someone who can
“provide[] a counternarrative intended to destabilize the narrative of
exclusion that accompanied marginalization and devaluation of
members of those groups.”365 This view of role models may better
bolster the need to provide role models for minorities of the same racial
group and substantiate a compelling interest for disparate impact.

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Addis, supra note 349, at 1406–07.
Id. at 1405–06.
Id. at 1406.
Id. at 1409–10.
Id. at 1410–11.
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3. Critiquing the Role Model Rationale
Notwithstanding the benefits that may result from using racial
classifications in disparate impact to provide role models, there are
some limitations with applying the role model rationale in the
employment context. This section considers those limitations and
concludes that the role model rationale risks disadvantaging minorities
in the workplace.
a. Limited Application in Employment Context
Like the diversity rationale, there may be limited use of the role
model argument to justify racial classifications in the workforce. First,
the need to provide role models at work may be prevalent in higherranked positions within an occupational field. Common sense dictates
that an emulator is generally interested in imitating the behavior of a
role model whom the emulator perceives as being more successful or in
a more advantageous position than the emulator. Therefore, the role
model argument is more applicable in occupations with a hierarchical
structure.
b. Sending a Message of Inferiority and Being a Means to an End
What may be of greater concern about the role model rationale for
justifying racial classifications in disparate impact are the unintended
negative consequences that may result. As Professor Anita Allen
eloquently pointed out, “One problem with the role model argument is
that while it trumpets our necessity, it whispers our inferiority. . . . [T]he
role model argument gives white males a reason for hiring minority
women that is perfectly consistent with traditional assumptions of white
male intellectual superiority.”366 Advancing a role model argument in
the employment context risks the implication that minorities are
intellectually inferior and unqualified for anything other than serving as
a role model for minorities.367 This may perpetuate the feeling among
minorities that they are undervalued.368
The sense of being undervalued may be even more heightened if
minority role models perceive themselves as a means to an end.369 The

366. Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 22, 37–38 (1990–
1991).
367. Id. at 38–39.
368. See id. at 39 (“Understandably, some black female academics resent the role model
argument. We resent it in the way that we resent all faint praise. It undervalues.”).
369. Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1227 (1991).
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employer may be advancing the role model rationale not to benefit the
individual employee, but the employer. Like the problem with the
diversity argument, minority role models are sought out to serve a
constituency that the employer seeks to reach.
Another related problem with the role model argument is “it signals
to [nonminorities] . . . that they may abandon efforts to serve as a
positive role model for [minorities].”370 A reliance on minorities to
serve as role models for other minorities suggests that it is a narrowlyfocused problem that only minorities can resolve.
c. Masking Discrimination
Like the diversity argument, the role model justification poses
another common threat to minorities—it has the potential to mask
discrimination. In Wygant, the Court warned that the role model
rationale could be abused to warrant a school’s refusal to hire AfricanAmerican teachers based on the low enrollment of African-American
students.371 Similar to the concern expressed in Wygant, an employer
may use the role model theory to justify not hiring or promoting
minorities to supervisory or other elevated positions when there are few
minority employees. Or, an employer may defend hiring or promoting a
Caucasian over a minority because there is a greater percentage of
Caucasians in need of a role model.
Using the role model argument can be a double-edged sword in
another respect. While the role model argument can open opportunities
for minorities who can serve as positive role models, it can
concomitantly be used to reject minorities from jobs for not being
positive role models. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club372 illustrates this
exact problem. In Chambers, the Girls Club trained its staff to act as
role models for the girls served by the organization.373 As part of its
role model approach, the Club instituted a policy of prohibiting
employees from engaging in certain acts that would result in immediate
discharge.374
Among the prohibitions were single parent
375
pregnancies.
The district court found that the policy had a disparate
impact: “[B]ecause of the significantly higher fertility rate among black

370. Allen, supra note 366, at 40.
371. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986).
372. 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
373. Id. at 699.
374. Id. at 699 n.2 (“Negative role modeling for Girls Club Members [includes] such things as
single parent pregnancies.”).
375. Id.
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females, the rule banning single pregnancies would impact black
women more harshly.”376 However, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the policy against single parent pregnancies based on
the role model theory and the employer’s business necessity for the
policy.377 The court accepted the Girls Club’s assertion that singleparent pregnancies among the Girls Club staff would send a message
that the Girls Club condoned pregnancies among the girls it served.378
Consequently, the likely potential for unintended consequences such as
sending a message of inferiority to minorities, treating minorities as a
means to an end, and masking discrimination undermine the role model
rationale to justify disparate impact’s use of racial classifications.
E. Operational Need
Additionally, the disparate impact provision might be shielded from
an Equal Protection Clause challenge on the basis of operational need.
The use of racial classification in disparate impact may be compelling if
race is essential to the job.
1. Defining Operational Need
The concepts of operational need, role modeling, and diversity are
distinct, though sometimes used interchangeably by courts. Operational
need refers to an employer’s “need to carry out its mission
effectively.”379 “Role models, in contrast, are people whose very
existence conveys a feeling of possibility to others; they give hope that
a previously restricted opportunity might now be available.”380 The
diversity rationale relies on the positive effects generated by differences
in racial background.
2. The Courts’ Responses to the Operational Need Rationale
The Supreme Court has not decided a case involving a race-based
employment practice justified on an operational need under the Equal
Protection Clause. In United States v. Paradise, the Supreme Court was
presented with the argument that a diverse police force is necessary to
foster community trust and facilitate law enforcement services by
enhancing community cooperation.381 The Supreme Court, however,

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 949 (D. Neb. 1986).
Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701–02.
Id. at 702–03.
Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court avoided deciding this issue in United States v. Paradise:
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did not address this operational needs rationale because evidence of past
discrimination was sufficient to satisfy a compelling interest.382
Although the Court has not decided this issue, it may be possible to
glean from prior cases how the Court would respond to the operational
need rationale. It could be argued that Grutter and Ambach provide
some optimism for the operational need rationale. Some have argued
that Grutter can be viewed to support racial diversity as an operational
need when the government functions as an educator.383
This
interpretation is based on the Court’s deference to the law school that
“diversity is essential to its educational mission.”384 Even granting this
interpretation, racial diversity may be an operational need that justifies
race-conscious admissions procedures but may be insufficient to justify
race-conscious employment decisions. The distinction between using
race to decide graduate school admission and to decide employment is
important because of the implication of individual rights. It may be
acceptable to allow race-conscious decisions in Grutter to advance the

Amici, the city of Birmingham, the city of Detroit, the city of Los Angeles, and the
District of Columbia, state that the operations of police departments are crippled by the
lingering effects of past discrimination. They believe that race-conscious relief in
hiring and promotion restores community trust in the fairness of law enforcement and
facilitates effective police service by encouraging citizen cooperation. [See also
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986)] (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“[I]n a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of police might
reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could develop a better relationship
with the community and do a more effective job of maintaining law and order than a
force composed only of white officers”); [NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th
Cir. 1974)] (“This is a police department and the visibility of the Black patrolman in
the community is a decided advantage for all segments of the public at a time when
racial divisiveness is plaguing law enforcement” (citation omitted)). Amicus NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., suggests that the governmental interest in a
racially integrated Department is amplified here due to community perceptions of, and
reactions to the Department’s historical role in defense of segregation and its active
opposition to the civil rights movement. We need not decide if either the generalized
governmental interest in effective law enforcement or the more particularized need to
overcome any impediments to law enforcement created by perceptions arising from the
egregious discriminatory conduct of the Department is compelling. In this case the
judicial determinations of prior discriminatory policies and conduct satisfy the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test.
480 U.S. 149, 167 n.18 (1987) (plurality opinion).
382. Id.
383. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Stifling the Potential of Grutter v. Bollinger: Parents Involved
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 88 B.U. L. REV. 937, 966 (2008) (arguing
that the government’s ability to function as an effective educator is diminished without racial
diversity).
384. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003); see Adams, supra note 383, at 966
(arguing that Grutter supports an operational need argument because diversity is necessary to the
educational mission of schools).
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operational need of the university because education, let alone graduate
education, is not a fundamental right.385 In contrast, the Court has
recognized that persons have a fundamental right to earn their
livelihood.386
Additionally, Ambach could be viewed as an endorsement of an
operational need rationale by the Court. In Ambach, the Court believed
it was necessary for teachers to be United States citizens to inculcate in
students lessons about civics and citizenship.387 In effect, Ambach can
be construed as endorsing an operational need argument—that the
nationality of the teacher was essential to the educational mission of
schools. Ambach lends greater support than Grutter for extending the
operational need argument to educators because at least in Ambach the
Court addressed hiring decisions. Even granting this interpretation of
Ambach, at most it would support an operational need for employment
decisions based on alienage and does not directly address race-based
decisions. Thus, construing Grutter and Ambach as accepting an
operational need argument may not be directly applicable to
employment.
Among the lower courts, several circuits have reviewed and accepted
race-based actions premised on an operational need in the fields of law
enforcement and corrections. In Barhold v. Rodriguez,388 while
considering a challenge made by New York parole officers to the
affirmative action plan used by the state division of parole, the Second
Circuit recognized that an operational need could be a compelling
interest for a “balanced workforce.”389
Similarly, in Wittmer v. Peters, the Seventh Circuit endorsed
operational need as a compelling interest when an African-American
correctional officer was promoted on the basis of his race for a
lieutenant’s position in a boot camp.390 The boot camp was an
experimental program for young criminals to experience the “old385. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 3 (1973) (asserting that
education is not a fundamental right).
386. See Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1985) (discussing the right to earn a
livelihood under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and finding that the practice of law is a
fundamental right); Lester Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 371 (1978)
(recognizing that Art. IV, § 2 protects a person’s right to “pursue a livelihood in a state other than
his own”); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589–90 (1897) (“The ‘liberty’ mentioned in [the
Fourteenth] amendment means . . . the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he will; to
earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation . . . .”).
387. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78–79 (1979).
388. Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1988).
389. Id. at 238.
390. 87 F.3d 916, 917 (7th Cir. 1996).
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fashioned military basic training, in which harsh regimentation,
including drill-sergeant abuse by correctional officers, is used to break
down and remold the character of the trainee.”391 The court upheld the
race-based promotion, reasoning that “[t]he black lieutenant is needed
because the black inmates are believed unlikely to play the correctional
game of brutal drill sergeant and brutalized recruit unless there are some
blacks in authority in the camp.”392
Operational need has also been found to be a compelling interest in
some cases involving law enforcement. The Sixth Circuit endorsed an
operational need rationale in Detroit Police Officers’ Association v.
Young.393 In Young, the court upheld a voluntary affirmative action
program implemented in the police department because minority
officers were needed for effective community policing.394 The court
opined,
The argument that police need more minority officers is not simply
that blacks communicate better with blacks or that a police department
should cater to the public’s desires. Rather, it is that effective crime
prevention and solution depend heavily on the public support and
cooperation which result only from public respect and confidence in
the police. In short, the focus is not on the superior performance of
minority officers, but on the public’s perception of law enforcement
officials and institutions.395

The Fourth Circuit has echoed a similar rationale to advance the
operational needs of the police. In Talbert v. City of Richmond, the
court upheld the city’s race-based promotion of officers to increase
diversity within the police department that served a city with a
population comprised of approximately 50% African-Americans.396
Reiterating the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Young,397 the court
concluded that the city had a legitimate purpose to consider race in
addressing the “operational needs of an urban police department serving
a multi-racial population.”398
In Reynolds v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit upheld a racebased promotion of a Hispanic officer on the justification of operational

391. Id.
392. Id. at 920.
393. 608 F.2d 671, 695 (6th Cir. 1979).
394. See id. at 696 (asserting that the community would have more trust in a police force with
a higher percentage of minorities).
395. Id.
396. 648 F.2d 925, 928 (4th Cir. 1981).
397. Id. at 931 (quoting Young, 608 F.2d at 695–96).
398. Id.
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need.399 The court accepted the city’s justification that it was necessary
to promote minorities to lieutenant and captain positions because as
“principal supervisors, . . . [t]hey set the tone for the department”400 and
would help to “sensitize” non-Hispanic police officers “to any special
problems in policing Hispanic neighborhoods.”401 The court concluded
that “[e]ffective police work, including the detection and apprehension
of criminals, requires that the police have the trust of that community
and they are more likely to have it if they have ‘ambassadors’ to the
community of the same ethnicity.”402
In another case involving Chicago police officers, the Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed in Petit v. City of Chicago that operational need could serve
as a compelling interest.403 The court pointed out that having a diverse
police force may be even more compelling in large metropolitan cities
that are racially and ethnically divided.404 There was an operational
need to have a diverse police force in Chicago because minorities in
urban areas “are frequently mistrustful of police and are more willing
than nonminorities to believe that the police engage in misconduct.”405
As one expert explained, policing depends upon the cooperation of the
community, which is negatively affected by lack of trust and confidence
in the police.406 Increased minority representation in the police force,
according to the expert, improves the community’s perception of the
police’s crime-prevention and crime-solving abilities.407
Not all circuits, however, have found an operational need to use
racial classification for police work.408 Although the Second Circuit
recognized operational need as a compelling interest in the penal
context in Barhold, it did not accept this justification in a case involving
law enforcement. In Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association of New York
v. City of New York, the Second Circuit invalidated the city’s racially

399. 296 F.3d 524, 530–31 (7th Cir. 2002).
400. Id. at 529.
401. Id. at 530.
402. Id.
403. 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003).
404. Id. at 1114.
405. Id. at 1115.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. The First Circuit was sympathetic to an operational needs argument in Cotter v. City of
Boston but did not reach the issue. 323 F.3d 160, 172 n.10 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We need not reach
the issue of whether avoiding litigation or meeting the operation needs of the [Police] Department
are compelling state interests. . . . We are much more sympathetic to the argument that
communities place more trust in a diverse police force and that the resulting trust reduces crime
rates and improves policing.”).
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motivated transfers of police officers that had been done in anticipation
of community violence.409 In that case, police officers had beaten and
tortured a Haitian immigrant.410 The community responded with public
demonstrations, causing city officials to fear that the protests would
degenerate into violence.411 As a result of this concern, the police
department transferred black and Hispanic police officers to the
precinct.412 The black and Hispanic police officers transferred to the
precinct were subjected to insults and epithets from the community413
and hostility by the precinct’s existing officers.414 Persuaded by expert
testimony that cultural skills were more important to policing than race
because African-American officers are “not necessarily better at
policing black communities than white officers,”415 and by the lack of
evidence to support a fear of community violence,416 the court
invalidated the city’s transfers.417 The court explained, “The mere
assertion of an ‘operational need’ to make race-conscious employment
decisions does not, however, give a police department carte blanche to
dole out work assignments based on race if no justification is
established.”418
While an operational need has been recognized in law enforcement
work, it has not been extended to firefighters. In Lomack v. City of
Newark, the Third Circuit, in dicta, appeared to refuse to accept an
operational need assertion for race-based transfers of firefighters.419
Other circuits have not directly answered the question whether an
operational need can be considered a compelling interest for a fire
department to consider race in making employment decisions.420

409. 310 F.3d 43, 44 (2d Cir. 2002).
410. Id. at 47.
411. Id.
412. The word “black” is used here to be more inclusive than “African-American,” because
some of the officers who were transferred identified themselves as African-American, BlackHispanic, Jamaican, West Indian, Trinidadian, or Guyanese. See id.
413. Id. at 48 (“[F]ar from being welcomed by black residents of the 70th Precinct, the
transferred officers endured frequent insults and epithets from community members angry about
the [Haitian immigrant’s] assault.”).
414. Id. (“Several plaintiffs also testified to tensions with the other officers in the precinct,
who viewed the new officers with suspicion, believing they were part of an NYPD internal affairs
investigation into the 70th Precinct.”).
415. Id.
416. Id. at 53.
417. Id. at 54.
418. Id. at 52.
419. 463 F.3d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Even if we were to liberally construe those assertions
as an operational needs argument, however, utterly no evidence supports it.”).
420. In McNamara v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit was confronted with this very issue
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3. Critiquing the Operational Need Rationale
a. Limited to Certain Occupations: Law Enforcement and Correctional
Institutions
The utility of the operational need rationale, like the diversity
rationale, may be limited to certain contexts. The Seventh Circuit, for
example, has confined operational need to a “small window for forms of
discrimination that are supported by compelling public safety concerns,
such as affirmative action in the staffing of police departments and
correctional institutions.”421
But even within the occupations of law enforcement and corrections,
there are limits to the application of operational need.
One
circumstance that would necessitate using racial classification is in the
instance of emergencies. Justice Stevens specified his approval under
such circumstances:
[I]n a city with a recent history of racial unrest, the superintendent of
police might reasonably conclude that an integrated police force could
develop a better relationship with the community and thereby do a
more effective job of maintaining law and order than a force
composed only of white officers.422

Justice Scalia similarly conditioned the use of race in emergencies
only:
At least where state or local action is at issue, only a social emergency
rising to the level of imminent danger to life and limb—for example, a
prison race riot, requiring temporary segregation of inmates, . . . can
justify an exception to the principle embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”423

but the insufficiency of the evidence at trial precluded the court’s determination of the issue. 138
F.3d 1219, 1222 (7th Cir. 1998). Similarly, although Alexander v. Estepp raised the defense that
the fire department’s affirmative action program was needed for “promoting more effective fire
prevention and firefighting by fostering the trust of a diverse public,” the Fourth Circuit did not
directly address this defense and invalidated the program because it was not narrowly tailored. 95
F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 1996).
421. Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 2002). Arguments have been
made that the operational need rationale should be applied to the military as well. See Leach,
supra note 308, at 1116–19 (arguing that the military is unique because of life and death
consequences, where mistrust breeds delay or hesitation).
422. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
423. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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Likewise, Justice Thomas concluded “that only those measures the State
must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence,
will constitute a ‘pressing public necessity’”424 for racial classifications.
One such social emergency that might have warranted racial
preferences was the racial unrest of the 1960s. During this time, there
was racial tension in communities across America that erupted in
violence.425
President Johnson created the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (also known as the Kerner
Commission) to study and make recommendations on the state of the
nation’s civil unrest.426 The Commission recommended “[i]ncreasing
communication across racial lines to destroy stereotypes, to halt
polarization, end distrust and hostility, and create common ground for
efforts toward public order and social justice.”427 To achieve these
objectives, the Commission also recommended increasing the hiring of
African-American police officers “to ensure that the police department
is fully and visibly integrated” because a police department comprised
mostly of Caucasians “can serve as a dangerous irritant; a feeling may
develop that the community is not being policed to maintain civil peace
but to maintain the status quo.”428
In contrast, the situation in Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association did
not necessitate the city’s racially based transfer of police officers.
Although there were public protests in that case, protests do not
necessarily lead to violence, as illustrated by the peaceful
demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.429 Patrolmen’s
Benevolent Association lacked the requisite urgency contemplated by
Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Thomas to justify racial classifications.

424. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
425. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders recounted: “The summer of 1967
again brought racial disorders to American cities, and with them shock, fear and bewilderment to
the nation. The worst came during a two-week period in July, first in Newark and then in Detroit.
Each set off a chain reaction in the neighboring communities.” NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON
CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT 1 (1968) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY
COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT]; see also Frymer & Skrentny, supra note
308, at 688–89 (describing the high level of violence in the 1960s).
426. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 689–90.
427. REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT,
supra note 425, at 20.
428. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 690 (quoting REPORT OF THE NAT’L ADVISORY
COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 425, at 165).
429. See David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1, 28 (Bernard Grofman ed.,
2002) (describing Martin Luther King, Jr. as a “student of Gandhi who was able to instill in his
followers his own commitment to nonviolence”).
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The other circumstance where the operational need rationale in law
enforcement and corrections would be most appropriate is where a
person’s race is essential to the task at hand. As Justice Stevens
recognized, considerations of race may be appropriate when “an
undercover agent is needed to infiltrate” a criminal group composed of
the same race.430 For example, in Perez v. FBI, the Fifth Circuit
approved of the use of racially based assignments of Hispanic agents to
undercover assignments.431
But while racial classifications may be necessary for some limited
circumstances, the operational need for race-based actions is unlikely to
justify disparate impact in most occupations. Among the cases that
upheld the operational need rationale, there was an asserted need that
community safety depended upon race-conscious hiring decisions,
either to enhance community cooperation or for authenticity in
undercover investigations.
Aside from law enforcement and
corrections, it would be difficult to find other occupations where public
safety necessitates that an employee be of a particular race. For
example, firefighting is essential to public safety, but race-conscious
hiring is not necessary to ensure community cooperation because the
contact that firefighters have with the community differs from that of
law enforcement. Firefighters do not have the power and discretion that
police officers have, which could be abused and lead to community
distrust. Additionally, the contacts that firefighters have with the
community generally result from community initiated calls for
emergencies like fires or vehicular accidents. In contrast, although
police officers respond to emergency calls, they are also on patrol duty,
traffic duty, etc., where unsolicited contact may lead to resentment or
distrust by the community members. Likewise, ambulance services are
also essential to public safety and dependent on community
cooperation, but that cooperation is unlikely to be affected by the race
of the ambulance drivers and emergency response personnel. Because
there are few occupations where racial tension affects community
cooperation in ensuring public safety or where authenticity is necessary
for investigations essential to public safety, the operational need
rationale is inapplicable to most occupations.

430. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 314 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
431. 707 F. Supp. 891, 912 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992).
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b. Similar to Using Race as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
i. Legislative History and Jurisprudence Against Race as a BFOQ
Using an operational need rationale to justify racial classifications in
disparate impact raises another concern—it is the equivalent to the
impermissible use of race as a bona fide occupational qualification
(“BFOQ”). Although Title VII prohibits discrimination, it allows for
certain exceptions. An employer may act “on the basis of religion, sex,
or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise.”432 The BFOQ exception permits employment practices
based on religion, sex, or national origin if religion, sex, or national
origin is essential to the job. A BFOQ “rests on the belief that there is
something essential about the behavior . . . of the demographic
group.”433
Race was intentionally omitted from the list of exceptions to
discrimination, and thus race cannot be a BFOQ.434 Congress
entertained an amendment to add race as a BFOQ but ultimately
rejected the amendment for fear that Caucasians could use race as a
BFOQ to the exclusion of minorities.435
Consistent with Title VII, courts have prohibited the use of race as a
BFOQ. One such case is Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service
Commission.436 In Knight, the Second Circuit invalidated the county
Civil Rights Commission’s involuntary transfer of an African-American

432. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000)).
433. Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 308, at 681–82.
434. See Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1980) (“This
provision of Title VII permits intentional or unintentional discrimination where religion, sex or
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification. Race is conspicuously absent from the
exception; there the bare statute could lead one to conclude that there is no exception for either
intentional or unintentional racial discrimination.”); Ray v. Univ. of Ark., 868 F. Supp. 1104,
1126 (E.D. Ark. 1994) (“Thus, in certain limited circumstances, courts are to recognize the bona
fide occupational qualification [“BFOQ”] defense. Race is conspicuously absent from the
statutory exceptions. This was clearly not an oversight. The plain language of the statute thus
precludes a race-based [BFOQ]. Courts have recognized that it is not irrational, but it is clearly
forbidden by Title VII, to refuse on racial grounds to hire someone because your customers or
clientele do not like his race.” (citations and internal alternations omitted)).
435. Leach, supra note 308, at 1095 n.15 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 2563 (1964)). For a
historical review of the development of the BFOQ exception, see Frymer & Skrentny, supra note
308, at 685–86.
436. 649 F.2d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1981).
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employee to the minority recruitment division.437 The Commission
conceded that Knight’s race was a predominant factor in its decision to
transfer him438 because it thought that Knight would more effectively
develop a rapport with the minorities who were being recruited for civil
service jobs.439 The court invalidated the Commission’s racially based
assignment on the following basis:
[The Commission’s employment decision] was based on a racial
stereotype that blacks work better with blacks and on the premise that
Knight’s race was directly related to his ability to do the job. No
matter how laudable the Commission’s intention might be in trying to
attract more minority applicants to the Civil Service[,] the fact remains
that Knight was assigned a particular job (against his wishes) because
his race was believed to specially qualify him for the work.440

ii. How an Operational Need Based on Race Is Similar to Using Race
as a BFOQ
Considerations of race as an operational need and race as a BFOQ
stand as a constitutional and statutory paradox. The lower courts have
upheld the use of race as an operational need under the Equal Protection
Clause in some circumstances, such as in Wittmer, Young, Talbert,
Reynolds, and Petit, but have consistently invalidated the use of race as
a BFOQ under Title VII, as seen in Knight. It is, however, conceptually
difficult to distinguish when race is permissibly used as an operational
need and when it is impermissibly used as a BFOQ. If there is a line
between the two, one must need X-ray vision to see it because it can be
argued that Wittmer, Young, Talbert, Reynolds, and Petit violated Title
VII’s prohibition against using race as a BFOQ. These cases relied on
the same stereotypical notion, as in Knight, that persons will work more
effectively with other members from their own racial group or that a
person’s race is linked to that person’s abilities. As Justice O’Connor
stated, “Social scientists may debate how peoples’ thoughts and
behavior reflect their background, but the Constitution provides that the
Government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals
based on the assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act
or think.”441 The justification of operational need seems to assume that
race or ethnicity determines how constituents will act or think.

437. Id. at 159–60.
438. Id. at 160.
439. Id. at 162.
440. Id.
441. Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 225–27 (1995) (rejecting Metro
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c. Similar to Customer Preference as a BFOQ
Another related problem is that race as an operational need is similar
to the prohibited use of customer preference as a BFOQ. The EEOC
Guidelines prohibit the use of customer preference in hiring,442 which
courts have enforced. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the
Fifth Circuit invalidated the airline’s exclusion of males from
employment as cabin flight attendants.443 The airline, based on its
considerable experience, believed that female flight attendants were
superior at “providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving
courteous personalized service and, in general, making flights as
pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft
operations.”444 Additionally, the trial court was persuaded by the
evidence that the airline passengers “overwhelmingly preferred to be
served by female stewardesses.”445 The airline presented expert
testimony of a psychiatrist who found that the unique environment of an
airplane cabin required consideration of the psychological needs of its
passengers, which was better met by female attendants.446 Despite the
evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that the airline was prohibited from
allowing customer preference to be used in its hiring decisions.447
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has rejected an attempt to use customer
preference to justify gender discrimination on the basis of a BFOQ. In
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., the employer asserted that its South
American clients preferred to conduct business transactions with a male
Director of International Operations and would refuse to interact with a
female holding this position.448 Notwithstanding the employer’s claims
that hiring a female director would “destroy the essence” of the
employer’s business or “create serious safety and efficacy problems,”449
the Ninth Circuit held that customer preference cannot justify the
employer’s discriminatory action.450

Broadcasting’s use of intermediate scrutiny to review some benign racial classifications and
broadly applying strict scrutiny to all federal racial classifications).
442. “The refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of coworkers, the employer,
clients or customers,” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (2010), “do[es] not warrant the application of
the bona fide occupational qualification exception,” id. § 1604.2(a)(1).
443. 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971).
444. Id. at 387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id. at 389.
448. 653 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1277.

NGOV.CORRECTED.PAGES_23.83.DOC

2010]

Battling for a Compelling Interest

12/3/2010 11:47:58 AM

77

Although the prohibition against relying on customer tastes to dictate
hiring decisions applies specifically to sex, it would apply more so to
race because race is not even a permissible BFOQ. Ray v. University of
Arkansas451 illustrates an impermissible attempt to base employment
decisions on customers’ racial preferences.452 In Ray, the court
invalidated the firing of a white security officer in a predominately
black university; the termination occurred because the employer
believed that “a white officer would be perceived negatively by a
portion of his constituent community which, in turn, could lead to racial
responses and confrontations.”453 The court held that some students’
“predisposition of racial animus toward white officers . . . [is a] form of
‘client’ preference [that] is no more permissible than any other, and will
not justify the different treatment of white officers.”454
As Ray demonstrates, using race as an operational need is similar to
using customers’ racial preferences as a BFOQ. When race is accepted
as an operational need, there is a reliance on the preference of the
customers, whether they are in the form of consumers, constituency, or
community members.455 Wittmer relied on the preference of the
African-American criminals whose cooperation depended upon the
presence of an African-American drill sergeant. Young, Talbert,
Reynolds, and Petit relied on the preference of the minority community
members who preferred to cooperate with minority officers. In fact,
Young and Talbert emphasized that the police department’s
employment decisions focused on the “public’s perception of law
enforcement officials and institutions,”456 and Reynolds and Petit
stressed the belief that increased minority representation in the police
force improves the public’s perception and willingness to work with the
police.457 The focus of the police department in Young, Talbert,
451. 868 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Ark. 1994).
452. The Fifth Circuit was also faced with a case of an employer using customer preference to
make race-based decisions. In EEOC v. Olson’s Diary Queens, Inc., the employer defended its
hiring decisions based on a perceived customer preference “to be served by persons of their own
‘culture.’” 989 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit dismissed, without much
discussion, the employer’s attempt to use customers’ racial preference as a justification. Id.
453. Ray, 868 F. Supp. at 1126.
454. Id. at 1126–27.
455. One court has rebutted this argument, relying on the city of Detroit’s history of racial
unrest to approve the Detroit Police Department’s operational needs defense for using racial
quotas. See Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 995–1003 (D.C. Mich. 1979), aff’d sub
nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983). This case, however, occurred
during a time of unyielding racial tension in Detroit.
456. Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925, 931 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting Young); Detroit
Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 696 (6th Cir. 1979).
457. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that lack of
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Reynolds, and Petit on the public’s perception is akin to a concession
that the police department was guided by its constituents’ preference for
race. Therefore, even if using race as an operational need would satisfy
a compelling interest, which the Supreme Court has not yet decided, it
would violate the statutory prohibition against using race and EEOC
Guidelines against using customer preference as BFOQ exceptions to
discrimination.
d. Adverse Effects of Operational Need Rationale
The last problem with race as an operational need is that it could, like
diversity, be used for pretextual discrimination and to disproportionately
burden minorities. For example, in Perez v. FBI, Hispanic agents were
disproportionately assigned to wiretaps because of their language
skills.458 These wiretap assignments posed particular hardships,
requiring agents to be confined to a vehicle or listening room with
limited movement for eight to twelve hours,459 and had a negative
impact on promotions.460 The FBI argued that the assignments were
based on its need for the Hispanic officers’ special language skills.461
The court held that “[t]he protection of the public safety and welfare
[did] not justify the discriminatory practices demonstrated at trial.”462
As Perez demonstrates, minorities whose race is perceived to be
essential to a job may risk bearing the burden of dangerous or
undesirable assignments.
Similarly, in Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, African-American
police officers were assigned to patrol a zone consisting predominately
of African-American residents and businesses.463 The police chief
rationalized the assignment with his belief that African-American
officers “are better able to cope” with African-American residents who
may act with hostility toward police officers.464 Additionally, the
police chief believed African-American police officers can more
effectively communicate with African-American residents, identify

confidence in police officers may negatively affect the willingness of community residents to
cooperate with non-minority officers); see also Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 530
(7th Cir. 2002) (explaining that non-minority police officers may be “less likely to be sensitized
to any specific problems” in minority communities).
458. 707 F. Supp. 891, 907 (W.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 956 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1992).
459. Id. at 909.
460. Id. at 910.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. 400 F.2d 294, 296 (5th Cir. 1968).
464. Id.
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members of their own race, and investigate criminal activities in
African-American neighborhoods than Caucasian officers.465 The Fifth
Circuit invalidated the police department’s practice of race-based
assignments, holding that the argument that “Negro officers are better
able to police Negro citizens cannot justify the blanket assignment of all
Negroes . . . .”466
Likewise, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, the police
department disproportionately assigned African-American and Hispanic
officers to patrol the high-crime, high-risk neighborhoods that were
more stressful and dangerous than the assignments that Caucasian
officers endured.467 The department explained that the officers were
assigned according to “the relative importance that they may have in
different types of neighborhoods.”468 The court found this justification
to be based on racial stereotypes and invalidated the department’s
assignment practices.469
Additionally, even if race is an operational need, there is a potential
that it could be applied to rationalize the exclusion of minorities, as
Congress had feared when it rejected allowing race as a BFOQ. The
same rationale in Wittmer, Young, Talbert, Petit, and Reynolds that
allowed race to justify the hiring and promotion of minorities could
equally be applied to their disadvantage. Assume in Wittmer that the
Caucasian inmates refused to play the drill sergeant game with an
African-American officer. The operational need rationale would
support the hiring of a Caucasian officer for the role of drill sergeant.
Or assume in Young, Talbert, Petit, and Reynolds that the community
was entirely composed of Caucasians and that Caucasians distrusted and
refused to cooperate with minority officers. In this situation, too, the
operational need rationale would justify hiring Caucasian officers.
Finally, as the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reminds us, a
reliance on an operational needs argument for racially-based
employment decisions has the potential to undermine the progress that
minorities have achieved. In 1984, the Commission issued a statement
relating to the case of Vanguard Justice Society, Inc. v. Hughes, which
involved the City of Detroit’s use of racial quotas within its police
department.470 The Commission warned:

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.

Id.
Id. at 301.
553 F. Supp. 601, 610 (D. Conn. 1983).
Id. at 611.
Id.
592 F. Supp. 245, 272–73 & n.88 (D. Md. 1984).
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The city asserts that the promotion quota was necessary to increase
black police officers at all ranks, in order to achieve more effective
law enforcement and reduce discriminatory treatment against black
citizens. This amounts to little more than a claim that only black
police officers can effectively provide law enforcement services to
black citizens or supervise lower-ranking black officers. Such a claim
has no place in a free, pluralistic society. If accepted, it would justify a
claim that members of a racial or ethnic group can be properly served
or treated only by members of that group. This would turn the clock
back to the “separate but equal” days of the past, when public entities
dispensed benefits, entitlements, and penalties of all kinds on the basis
of a person’s skin color.471

Therefore, using race as an operational need poses many of the same
problems as diversity: reliance on stereotypes, potential for exclusion of
minorities, and potential for minorities to shoulder the burden at a
particular job. These problems pose significant obstacles to justify a
compelling interest in using racial classifications in disparate impact.
F. Removing Barriers to Employment
One last defense that might protect Title VII’s disparate impact
provision against an Equal Protection Clause challenge is the
compelling interest of removing barriers to employment. This section
discusses the historical context and legislative intent of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. This section also
examines whether the goal of removing barriers to employment is
sufficient to sustain the disparate impact provision’s racial
classifications.
1. What is the Government’s Purpose?
As early as Griggs, the Court recognized that “[t]he objective of
Congress in [the] enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and
remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of . . . employees over other employees.”472 The intent of
Congress, as the Griggs Court explained, was not to “command[] that
the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because
of minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such,
Congress has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that
race . . . become[s] irrelevant.”473 Ricci reiterated “the important
471. Id.
472. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971).
473. Id. at 436.
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purpose of Title VII—that the workplace be an environment free of
discrimination, where race is not a barrier to opportunity.”474
Congress, however, may not have had disparate impact theory in
mind when it enacted Title VII.475 Congress had amended the Act
several times since its initial passage in 1964,476 but Congress did not
expressly authorize disparate impact claims until the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Consequently, some argue that Congress’s sole concern was with
intentional discrimination when it enacted Title VII.477 Regardless of
whether Congress originally intended the disparate impact theory when
it enacted the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Congress’s
subsequent adoption of Griggs and codification of disparate impact in
the 1991 amendment evinces intent for disparate impact to serve as an
additional means of effectuating the Act’s intent—removing barriers
and providing equal employment opportunities.

474. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (2009).
475. See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs Disparate Impact Theory and the
Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 223
(1990) (“The Act, however, remains silent about whether it is also concerned with facially neutral
employment practices, adopted without a discriminatory motive, that adversely affect the
employment opportunities of racial minorities and women. The legislative history of Title VII, as
originally enacted, is inconclusive on this issue.”); Browne, supra note 70, at 293 (“The language
of Title VII does not easily lend itself to the disparate-impact theory. Likewise, nothing in the
legislative history supports the assertion that the 1964 Congress in any way intended to outlaw
job qualifications that were not intended to discriminate. In fact, the relevant legislative history
suggests the contrary.”); Michael E. Gold, Grigg’s Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and
Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation
for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429, 492 (1985) (arguing that Congress did not intend to regulate
non-intentional discrimination when enacting Title VII and that employment discrimination
should be analyzed according to intent); Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully)
on Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (“Title VII . . .
suggest[s] that liability is premised on improper motivation. Little in the language of the Act and
even less from its legislative history suggests that liability can be premised solely on the effect a
selection device has on a class protected by the statute.”); Rutherglen, supra note 172, at 1298
(“Only under an extremely strained interpretation can the [principal prohibitions of Title VII] be
forced to yield an explicit prohibition against neutral practices with adverse impact.”).
476. Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1972, expanding Title VII to cover private and
governmental employers. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 155, at 15. In 1978, Congress
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978. Id. at
731; see Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 275 (1987) (deciding whether the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 preempts state statute regarding leave and reinstatement
for pregnancy).
477. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 475, at 492 (arguing that Congress’s sole intent in enacting
Title VII was to prohibit intentional discrimination by employers).
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2. Determining Whether Removing Employment Barriers and
Providing Equal Employment Opportunities Is Compelling
Is a governmental interest in removing barriers and providing equal
employment opportunities compelling to justify the disparate impact
provision’s racial classifications? The Constitution does not provide a
direct answer to this question because the Constitution does not
explicitly define compelling interests or provide the weight to be
accorded to particular interests.478 Turning to whether Congress has the
power to act does not answer the query because “[t]he mere existence of
a power is an insufficient basis for finding a compelling interest.”479
The governmental powers rationale is inadequate to support an
inference of compelling governmental interests because statutes’
original objectives may have “become irrelevant or unattainable, or
changed circumstances may have created unintended consequences for
application of the original expectation that such statutes were
proper.”480 For example, when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964, it chose to act under the authority of the Commerce Clause
because The Civil Rights Cases: United States v. Stanley481 led
Congress to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment would be a tenuous
basis for congressional authority.482 In The Civil Rights Cases, the
Court held that Congress lacked the power to enact legislation
regulating private conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment.483 Acting
under the Commerce Clause, Congress succeeded. In Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States484 and Katzenbach v. McClung,485 the Court
upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964.486 In this instance, because the
Commerce Clause was not Congress’s initial choice of powers to
sustain the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a reliance on the governmental

478. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 919 (1988)
(“[C]ompelling interests lack a strong textual foundation in the Constitution.”).
479. Id. at 938.
480. Id. at 939.
481. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
482. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 168 (3d ed. 2009).
483. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11.
484. 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
485. 379 U.S. 294, 300–04 (1964).
486. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was invalidated as applied to private conduct, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 contained provisions similar to the 1875 Act. See J. Morgan Kousser,
What Light Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 Shed on the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, in LEGACIES
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 33 (Bernard Grofman ed., 2002) (highlighting, for example, that
the 1875 Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 both contained provisions providing for the full
and equal enjoyment of public accommodations).
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powers rationale to determine compelling interests would be misguided.
Rather, more reliable sources of governmental purpose may be found in
the “rights described in the constitutional text, penumbras, and means to
constitutionally specified ends.”487
“[C]ertain explicitly guaranteed rights may provide a firmer basis for
finding a compelling governmental interest than either purposes or
powers.”488 For example, rights to life, liberty, and property may
justify inferences of compelling governmental interests because of their
explicit description in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.489
Additionally, an “obligation of equality, which is explicitly developed
in five amendments,”490 including the Fourteenth Amendment, may
support an inference of compelling governmental interests.
An inference that Title VII’s disparate impact provision serves a
compelling governmental interest may be made because the provision
protects explicitly guaranteed liberty and equality rights. As the Court
has recognized, the right to earn a livelihood is a liberty interest.491
Title VII’s disparate impact provision advances this liberty interest
through its objective in removing barriers to employment. The
provision also protects the right to equality by prohibiting employment
discrimination, regardless of employer intent, and thereby provides for
equal employment opportunities.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 advances the same
egalitarian interests as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
because the two were created to address similar social injustice.
Congress enacted the Fourteenth Amendment to respond to the postCivil War discrimination directed at former slaves. After the Civil War,
southern states discriminated against former slaves by passing Black
Codes492 that restricted full exercise of their liberty493 and “imposed a

487. Gottlieb, supra note 478, at 937.
488. Id. at 939.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (describing the Constitutional basis of the
right to earn a livelihood as a liberty interest).
492. The Codes prohibited African-Americans from renting land, prevented “servants from
leaving their masters’ premises” and authorized the arrest and return of African-Americans who
breached labor contracts to their employers. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 425 (2d ed. 2005); see also MICHAEL KENT CURTIS
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN CONTEXT 677 (2d ed. 2006) (providing excerpts from
Louisiana’s “Black Code” for regulating Freedmen); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT
THAT REFUSED TO DIE 86 (2000) (discussing the “Black Codes, which the states passed to limit
the freedom of movement of the newly emancipated after the Civil War . . . .”).
493. See CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 703 (“To address the deprivations of civil rights
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second-class status just short of slavery on blacks.”494 In response,
Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of 1866 to void the Black Codes
and protect the civil rights of African-Americans.495 At this time,
Congress also drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,496 one of the Civil
War or Reconstruction-Era Amendments, to address the prevailing
discrimination against former slaves after the Civil War.497 “One
purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ‘constitutionalize’ the
Civil Rights Act . . . .”498 The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 were “inextricably linked . . . , since section one was
added to the amendment at least in part to remove doubts about the
constitutionality of the 1866 act.”499
The vision of equality for African-Americans that fueled the drafting
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment also
gave rise to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When the states ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment, the plight of African-Americans did not end.
As the Reconstruction Era came to a close, many states adopted “Jim
Crow laws” that discriminated against African-Americans by requiring
separation of the races, such as segregation in public accommodations,
transportation, and schools.500 In response, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to eliminate segregation in public places and
and civil liberties in the post-Civil War South, Congress passed a series of civil statutes . . . .”).
494. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43 (2d ed. 1995).
495. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 678; NELSON, supra note 494, at 48.
496. CURTIS ET AL., supra note 492, at 678.
497. HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS &
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 36 (8th ed. 2003) (“[Congress] wanted to do something to
ameliorate the lot of blacks; . . . they intended to embody the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, forbidding ‘discrimination in civil rights or immunities . . . on account of race’ . . . ; at least
to some extent they were concerned with civil rights generally . . . .”); RANDY E. BARNETT,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 264 (2008) (“It is generally accepted that the
Fourteenth Amendment was formulated to ensure that Congress had the power to enact this
legislation, and to prevent a future repeal of the protections contained in the Civil Rights Act.”);
WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND
INTEGRATION 261 (2004) (“The Fourteenth Amendment is one of the three Reconstruction-Era
amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments) that abolished slavery and
resolved other slavery and Civil War-related issues.”); JOHN C. KNECHTLE & CHRISTOPHER J.
ROEDERER, MASTERING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 (2009); David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House
Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 337 (2003) (“The Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was adopted to deal with the aftermath of slavery and the racial discrimination that
prevailed after the Civil War.”).
498. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 492, at 429; see also NELSON, supra note 494, at 3
(discussing an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
purpose was “to concretize in constitutional law the right to equality and other rights . . . .”).
499. NELSON, supra note 494, at 104.
500. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 482, at 765.
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blatantly discriminatory employment practices.501 Specifically, “[Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act] reflect[ed] Congress’s concern with the
problem of racism in American labor markets, and with the failure of
the descendants of those brought to America as slaves to achieve
economic equality.”502 Therefore, their parallel origins and purpose of
protecting liberty and equality rights harmonize Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment, fortifying the
inference that Title VII’s disparate impact provision serves a compelling
interest.
3. How the Disparate Impact Provision Eliminates Barriers and
Provides Equal Employment Opportunities
Congress’s vision for eliminating barriers and providing equal
employment opportunities might not have included the disparate impact
theory at Title VII’s conception, but the disparate impact provision
achieves Title VII’s objective nonetheless. The disparate impact
provision removes barriers by ensuring that business practices lacking
business necessity and job relatedness do not deprive any racial group
of employment opportunities. Disparate impact’s racial classifications
may be justified because they are needed to determine if such a barrier
exists. But the existence of such a barrier alone is not the basis of
liability—it merely prompts an inquiry into the business practice.
Rather, liability results only when an employer fails to show business
necessity and job relatedness, or when the employer refuses to use a less
adverse alternative that still serves the needs of the employer.503 The
consequence of finding an employer in violation of the disparate impact
provision means simply that the employer may not use the selection
criterion or employment practice at issue.504 The disparate impact
provision does not substantially interfere with an employer’s
501. See LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 1 (Bernard Grofman ed., Univ. Press of
Va. 2002) (“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . broke once and for all the Jim Crow legacy of the
post-Reconstruction South and largely ended the overt and legally sanctioned forms of
discrimination against blacks . . . .”).
502. ESTREICHER & HARPER, supra note 155, at 4.
503. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2673 (2009) (explaining that an employer may
defend itself against liability for employment discrimination if the employer can show the
practice is job related for the position at issue, a business necessity, and that there is no available
alternative that has less disparate impact).
504. See Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 205 F.R.D. 466, 473 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“The
plaintiff in a disparate impact case may seek only equitable relief such as injunctive and
declaratory relief, reinstatement to a position and back pay, and a jury trial is not mandated. 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (compensatory and punitive damages not available in disparate impact
case); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (providing for equitable relief under Title VII).”), aff’d, 370 F.3d
565 (6th Cir. 2004).
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prerogatives because the employer is free to explore other selection
methods. Additionally, the employer is not subject to compensatory or
punitive damages as in disparate treatment cases.505 Consequently, it is
difficult to justify an employer’s insistence to continue a business
practice that adversely affects racial groups when there is no business
necessity or when there are equally effective alternatives that have less
adverse effect.
Although
Congress did not intend by Title VII . . . to guarantee a job to every
person regardless of qualifications, . . . [w]hat is required by Congress
is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on
the basis of racial or other impermissible classification.506

A business practice that causes an adverse impact but not invidious
discrimination is nonetheless an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary
barrier if there is no business necessity for that practice or other
alternatives exist that will meet the employer’s needs but have less
adverse effect. By eliminating business practices unnecessarily causing
an adverse impact, the disparate impact provision removes racial
barriers and thereby serves to achieve equality in employment
opportunities.
CONCLUSION: PEACE TREATY?
The intent of this Article was to do as Justice Scalia advised—to
“begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace

505. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1981(a)); Bacon, 205 F.R.D. at 473; Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Prod., Inc., 185
F.R.D. 230, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“[I]n a Title VII disparate impact case, the employee may
seek only equitable relief, to include back pay; no damages are permitted.”); Judith J. Johnson,
Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Resuscitate the “Reasonable Factors
Other Than Age” Defense and the Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1399, 1439
(2004) (“Remedies in disparate impact cases remain exclusively equitable under Title VII . . . .”);
Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 193 (2003)
(“[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides for compensatory and punitive damages in
employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when
plaintiffs prove that the defendant ‘engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination,’ while
providing equitable relief alone for plaintiffs who show only a disparate impact.”); Gerald A.
Madek, Tax Treatment of Damages Awarded for Age Discrimination, 12 AKRON TAX J. 161, 164
(1996) (“Title VII allows only for equitable relief for successful disparate impact claims and not
for compensatory or punitive damages.”).
506. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971)), aff’d, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976), superceded
by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Dare
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003).
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between”507 disparate impact and Equal Protection before the war that
he predicted occurs. If we agree that disparate impact uses racial
classifications, then disparate impact is vulnerable to attack by an Equal
Protection Clause challenge. Title VII’s disparate impact provision may
be defended by asserting that it remedies past discrimination, smokes
out discrimination, enhances diversity, provides role models, or meets
an operational need. None of these defenses, however, provide a
compelling interest for the disparate impact provision. The diversity,
role model, and operational need rationales are inadequate defenses
because they can be manipulated to exploit minorities as means to an
end. These three rationales do not focus on advancing the interests of
the individual employees, but rather on facilitating working relations
with racial groups in order to increase efficiency and maximize
employer profits. They are employer-centered rationales. These
justifications also risk subjecting minorities to pretextual discrimination,
perpetuating stereotypes, and excluding minorities from employment
opportunities.
The smoking out discrimination and remedial need rationales are the
most faithful to Griggs and the purpose of Title VII because they focus
on opening opportunities for individuals. However, the smoking out
intentional discrimination justification seems antithetical to disparate
impact because disparate impact does not rely on intent. Additionally,
the smoking out unconscious bias justification is undermined by
inconclusive implicit bias research that is subject to contradictory
interpretations.
The remedial need rationale offers a stronger justification for
disparate impact’s reliance on racial classification because the remedial
need rationale has long been accepted by the Supreme Court. The
remedial need rationale, however, may provide the narrowest protection
for disparate impact. The remedial need rationale is dependent on
showing that an employer previously discriminated. It is unlikely that,
when the government enforces the disparate impact provision, it can
trace back instances of prior constitutional or statutory violations by the
particular employer.
This search for a compelling interest has revealed that these
justifications—remedying
past
discrimination,
smoking
out
discrimination, enhancing diversity, providing role models, and meeting
an operational need—are likely insufficient to serve as a compelling
interest after consideration of their shortcomings. A rationale advanced

507. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2683 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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to support disparate impact’s use of racial classifications must be an
impenetrable defense in light of the government’s use of a “highly
suspect tool”508 like racial classification.
Removing barriers to employment, however, might be the strongest
defense for the disparate impact provision because it protects liberty and
equality rights. The disparate impact provision removes arbitrary and
unnecessary barriers to employment by eliminating business practices
that adversely impact racial groups without a business justification or
where there are equally effective alternatives with less adverse effect.
In this way, the provision affords people economic liberty and equality
by allowing them to attain their livelihood without unnecessary racial
barriers. Ironically, what potentially could have led to the disparate
impact provision’s destruction could lead to its defense—the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act can be harmonized by the
commonality of their origins and purpose in protecting liberty and
equality rights. Thus, when the war is waged between the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII’s disparate impact provision, peace
might be made between the two through the compelling interest of
achieving equal employment opportunity through the removal of
barriers.

508. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).

